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This is the first attempt to study leasing in the context of the international trade 
in cultural artifacts.  This Article advances a heated debate in the field of cultural 
heritage law, which centers on whether cultural artifacts of ancient civilizations 
should belong to the modern nation states from which they are excavated or to 
humankind in general, by proposing an alternative analytic framework based on 
leasing.  This framework would make it possible for objects to circulate but at the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Several scandals involving U.S. museums buying illicitly traded ancient artifacts 
surfaced in relation to and after the criminal prosecution of Marion True, former 
senior curator for antiquities at the J. Paul Getty Museum.  In 2005, True was 
indicted in Italy on charges of conspiring to acquire artifacts that were illegally 
removed from Italian soil, and the Getty was required to repatriate around forty of 
its most important objects acquired for a total of $44 million.1  The Getty case was 
a catalyst for several similar cases that followed:  the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
in New York returned a number of objects including the Euphronios krater to 
Rome, as did several other institutions, including the Museum of Fine Arts in 
Boston, the Cleveland Museum of Art and the Princeton University Art Museum.2  
Over the span of nearly four decades, curators were accused of pitching artifacts 
with a dubious or incomplete provenance to the trustees of their institutions, until 
source countries claimed some of the objects back.3  How could the internal 
processes of large and prestigious U.S. institutions permit buying illicitly traded 
items?  How could things go so wrong as to justify criminal prosecutions and more 
than 100 returns?  Most importantly, how can U.S. institutions continue collecting 
antiquities given these precedents? 
This Article addresses the problem of how U.S. museums can continue to collect 
ancient classical artifacts on the international art market by proposing the 
development of a rental market to supplement the currently narrow sales market.  
The broader context in which this analysis is to be viewed requires the 
consideration of two ways of thinking about the movement of cultural property that 
developed in the past decades:  the first conceives of cultural artifacts as an integral 
part of a national cultural heritage and the second as property common to all 
mankind.4  In accordance with this distinction, countries can be divided into two 
separate categories:  source nations, like Italy and Greece, that are rich in art and 
have enacted patrimony laws that prohibit the sale of cultural objects, and market 
nations, such as the United States, that favor the more cosmopolitan interpretation 
 
 1. JASON FELCH & RALPH FRAMMOLINO, CHASING APHRODITE: THE HUNT FOR LOOTED 
ANTIQUITIES AT THE WORLD’S RICHEST MUSEUM 259 (2011); see also FABIO ISMAN, I PREDATORI 
DELL’ARTE PERDUTA: IL SACCHEGGIO DELL’ARCHEOLOGIA IN ITALIA [RAIDERS OF THE LOST ART: THE 
LOOTING OF ARCHAEOLOGY IN ITALY] (2009). 
 2. FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 307. 
 3. Id.; see also David Gill & Christopher Chippendale, From Boston to Rome: Reflections on 
Returning Antiquities, 13 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 311, 312 (2006); David Gill & Christopher 
Chippindale, From Malibu to Rome: Further Developments on the Return of Antiquities, 14 INT’L J. 
CULTURAL PROP. 205, 205–06 (2007) [hereinafter Gill & Chippendale, From Malibu to Rome]. 
 4. The nationalist versus internationalist debate was introduced by the seminal paper of John 
Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831 (1986).  For 
representative arguments on the internationalist side, see JAMES CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY?  
MUSEUMS AND THE BATTLE OVER OUR ANCIENT HERITAGE (2008).  For representative arguments on 
the side of the archaeologists, see Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 
ART J. 94, 94 (1969), and TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD’S 
CULTURAL HERITAGE (Neil Brodie, Jennifer Doole & Colin Renfrew eds., 2001). 
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and would like objects to freely circulate and be available on the international art 
market.  At the moment, source nations seem to prevail because the sovereign 
governments of source countries have enacted legislation that impedes the 
international movement of cultural artifacts and have persuaded market nations to 
aid them in their retention efforts.5  What remains is a scenario where in source 
nations the supply of artifacts exceeds the demand yet the surplus cannot be 
exported, while on the other hand the demand of artifacts in market nations exceeds 
the supply but national and international laws prevent the market nations from 
importing artifacts. 
The extensive restrictions on the export of ancient objects dictated by the 
patrimony laws of source nations have left the demand of museums and collectors 
in market countries unfulfilled.  Faced with the diminishing supply of legitimate 
objects, U.S. museums seeking to enlarge their antiquities collections continued 
acquiring unprovenanced artifacts, which were often the product of illicit 
excavations.  Increasingly aware of the damage caused by such practices, the 
international community introduced the 1970 UNESCO Convention, a 
supranational instrument aimed at combating illicit trade by mandating the 
restitution of unlawfully exported objects.6  In essence, the 1970 Convention was 
an attempt by source countries to externalize the enforcement costs by shifting the 
responsibility of policing the illicit trade in cultural artifacts onto market nations.7  
In the United States, for instance, the Convention was implemented by putting into 
place import restrictions for broad ranges of cultural artifacts coming from source 
nations party to the Convention.8  Instead of curtailing illicit trade and making the 
market more transparent, these efforts aimed at retaining and returning cultural 
property not only narrowed the trade in legitimate ancient objects, but, given that 
the demand remained high, it also led to large numbers of artifacts being smuggled 
across national borders and sold on the black market.9  This Article examines the 
effect of national and international legal measures on the antiquities trade and 
substantiates their inefficiency by supplying empirical evidence of the illicit trade 
and illustrating the scope of the problems associated with collecting antiquities 
subject to patrimony laws. 
In recent years, after source countries like Italy and Greece successfully 
 
 5. See Legge 1 giugno 1939, n. 1089 (It.), amended by Legge 1 marzo 1975, n. 44 (It.), Legge 
30 marzo 1998, n. 88 (It.), and Legge 30 marzo 1998, n. 100 (It.); Nomos (1932:5351) O nomos 
Arxaiotitwn [The Antiquities Act], 1932 (Greece); see also Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 13(b), Nov. 14, 
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention]. 
 6. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, pmbl., art. 2.  
 7. Asif Efrat, Protecting Against Plunder: The United States and the International Efforts 
Against Looting of Antiquities 4 (Cornell Law Sch., Working Paper No. 47, 2009).  
 8. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446, § 300–15, 96 Stat. 
2339, 2350–63 (1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13 (2012)). 
 9. Merryman, supra note 4, at 847–48; see also LYNDEL PROTT, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
OF THE 1970 CONVENTION: AN EVALUATION 40 YEARS AFTER ITS ADOPTION (2011), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Brussels/pdf/strengths%20and%20weakn
esses%20of%20the1970%20convention.pdf. 
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reclaimed illicitly exported objects, the acquisitions of antiquities by U.S. museums 
are at low levels.10  To overcome the legal limits of the international antiquities 
trade and to enable museums to expand their collections and educational goals in an 
ethical way, this Article proposes a new avenue:  the development of a rental 
market for ancient artifacts.  In order to assess whether a rental market is a viable 
option for furthering the circulation and display of cultural property, this Article 
relies on interviews with museum officials, data about past acquisitions, and the 
analysis of cooperation agreements between several U.S. museums and source 
countries in connection with the restitution of illegally traded items.11  With the 
help of this data, this Article aims to show that long-term leases could not only be 
an attractive addition to existing collecting strategies, but could also bridge some of 
the issues raised in the nationalist versus internationalist debate. 
This is the first attempt to study leasing in the context of the international trade 
in cultural artifacts.  A few commentators have referred to leasing as a potential 
solution to the problem of illicit trade in general terms, but there has not been an in-
depth analysis and explanation about how such a market could be developed.12  
From an economic perspective, a draft paper by Kramer and Wilkening develops a 
formal model showing the effects of export bans on the antiquities trade and 
suggests that leases and sale contracts with options to buy back could create 
revenue in source countries and incentivize preservation by putting objects into the 
hands of the highest value consumer through auctions.13  Their model is useful but 
incomplete because it lacks a legal perspective, which is crucial to the issue.  This 
Paper presents the first legal and empirical study of leasing in the context of the 
antiquities trade.  It builds on the work of Bator, Gerstenblith, Pearlstein and others 
who analyze the effects of the 1970 Convention and its implementation in the 
United States; yet, it goes further in assessing the impact of these legal measures on 
two related phenomena:  illicit trade and the level of antiquities acquisitions of 
major US institutions.14  The impact on illicit trade is measured through the 
 
 10. FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 307; see also infra figs. Part II.A. 
 11. This Article also relies at times on my work experience at UNESCO and familiarity with the 
Italian ministry system, including its ministry of culture. 
 12. Bernard Frischer, Dir., Inst. for Advanced Tech. in the Humanities, Univ. of Va., The Grand 
Compromise: A Hybrid Approach to Solving the Problem of Looted Art 8 (Oct. 20, 2006) (presentation 
paper, Eleventh International Congress on Cultural Heritage and New Technologies); see also Suna 
Erdem, New Trojan War Highlights Pillage of Turkey’s Past, REUTERS, Oct. 13, 1993, available at 
Westlaw NewsRoom. 
 13. Michael Kremer & Tom Wilkening, Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases? 
30–43 (Feb. 17, 2009) (unpublished paper), available at http:// dev.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/ 
Kremer_Antiquities.pdf. 
 14. William G. Pearlstein, Cultural Property, Congress, the Courts, and Customs: The Decline 
and Fall of the Antiquities Market?, in WHO OWNS THE PAST?  CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL 
PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 9 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., 2005); Paul Bator, An Essay on the International 
Trade, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275 (1982); Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of 
Cultural Objects, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 197 (2001); John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property 
Internationalism, 12 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 11 (2005); James Nafziger, The New International Legal 
Framework for the Return, Restitution or Forfeiture of Cultural Property, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
789 (1983).  
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empirical evaluation of import and export data of cultural objects.  The impact on 
acquisitions is measured by looking at the acquisition trends of selected collections 
over time and the introduction of acquisition policies.  This Paper intends to offer 
an alternative analytic framework to a sales market based on arguments favoring 
the introduction of a leasing market.  The recent returns of artifacts from museums 
in the United States to Italy and Greece prompted this research.  Given the 
empirical angle, the scope of this Paper is limited to considering the potential 
development of leasing strategies of ancient classical artifacts originating from Italy 
and Greece to institutions in the United States.  Future research may focus on the 
leasing options of other source countries. 
Section I explains how the relevant legal frameworks governing the market for 
cultural property—namely, Italian and Greek patrimony laws and the 1970 
UNESCO Convention—have not only restricted the legal trade in such objects, but 
have also led to the growth of illicit trading.  This section includes the empirical 
analysis of data on the export of Italian and Greek cultural artifacts and their import 
into the United States.  Section II examines the impact of illicit trade on collecting 
strategies and acquisition levels of three important U.S. museums with established 
antiquities collections:  the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the J. Paul Getty Museum 
and the Princeton University Art Museum.  This section includes a discussion of 
cooperation agreements that were negotiated by the above institutions in 
connection with the return of illegally traded items and focuses on how such 
agreements provided the museums with loans in exchange for the returned items.  
Section III argues that long-term leases could be a useful addition to the present 
collecting strategies of museums in the United States.  In order to show how a 
leasing market for ancient artifacts could be developed in practice, this part of the 
Paper examines:  demand preferences and the objects likely be leased; the Italian 
and Greek laws regulating the temporary exit of artifacts; and the potential 
restrictions on the use of resources available to museums in the United States.  
Finally, Section IV addresses differences between art systems in source countries 
and in the United States. 
I.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ILLICIT TRADE 
This section explains how the interaction of national and international legal 
measures governing the trade in cultural objects has generally resulted in the 
restriction of the licit trade and in the growth of the illicit trade in such objects.  It 
first addresses the complications that strict patrimony laws, in combination with the 
supranational framework set up by the 1970 UNESCO Convention, have created 
with respect to the international trade in cultural objects.  Although a substantial 
literature already exists on this point,15 it is worth summarizing the main thoughts 
behind the legal framework in order to lay a solid ground for the discussion that 
 
 15. See Gerstenblith, supra note 14; Merryman, supra note 14; Nafziger, supra note 14; 
Pearlstein, supra note 14. 
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follows.  Next, it examines the impact of the existing legal regime on the trade in 
such objects, with a focus on illicit trade.  To analyze how leasing can overcome 
this problem, the leasing framework will then be applied to cultural artifacts from 
Italy and Greece put up for sale on the U.S. market.  The discussion of the legal 
framework will therefore refer to the Italian and Greek patrimony laws and how the 
1970 Convention was implemented in the United States. 
A.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Ancient civilizations spanned vast regions of lands that do not correspond to 
modern day nation states.  Records of the creation, movement and trade of most 
objects are lost in antiquity and often it is impossible to know the true provenance 
of an object.  In most source countries, patrimony laws regulate cultural material 
excavated from archaeological sites.16  Such laws solve the problem of 
discontinuity of title by declaring any archaeological object—excavated or not yet 
excavated from the national soil—to be the property of the state.17  The rationale 
behind this was summarized by an Irish court as follows:  “[A] necessary ingredient 
of sovereignty in a modern State was and should be the ownership by the State of 
objects which constitute antiquities of importance which were discovered and 
which had no known owner.”18  Typically the state in question does not allow such 
objects to be sold on the market, neither within nor outside its borders, and this 
usually limits the market of ancient artifacts of a given source country to the 
objects that were privately owned before the patrimony laws were passed and for 
which authorization to export is obtained by the relevant authority.19  Sometimes 
the export of privately owned objects is circumscribed, for instance, when the state 
can statutorily exercise the right of preemption.20 
Greece was the first nation to vest ownership of all of its antiquities within the 
state in 1834.21  The Greek antiquities law declares that “all antiquities within 
Greece, being works of the ancestors of the Greek peoples, are considered national 
property belonging to all Greeks” and that  “all ruins or other antiquities . . . found 
on national land or under it, on the sea bed, in rivers, public streams, lakes or 
 
 16. Legge 1 giugno 1939, n. 1089 (It.), amended by Legge 1 marzo 1975, n. 44 (It.), Legge 30 
marzo 1998, n. 88 (It.), and Legge 30 marzo 1998, n. 100 (It.); Nomos (1932:5351) O nomos 
Arxaiotitwn [The Antiquities Act], 1932 (Greece). 
 17. L. n. 1089/1939 art. 6 (It.); Nomos (1932:5351) arts. 61–62 O nomos Arxaiotitwn [The 
Antiquities Act], 1932 (Greece). 
 18. Webb v. Ireland [1988] I.R. 353, 383. 
 19. L. n. 1089/1939 arts. 30–34 (It.).  For legislation governing the impact and export of cultural 
property for several other countries, see LYNDEL V. PROTT & PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, HANDBOOK OF 
NATIONAL REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (1988); Art Law and 
Cultural Property, INT’L FOUND. FOR ART RES., http://ifar.org/art_law.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).  
 20. L. n. 1089/1939 arts. 31, 61 (It.); see also PROTT & O’KEEFE, supra note 19.  
 21. Nomos (1834:10/22) [On Scientific and Technological Collections and on the Discovery and 
Preservation of Antiquities and their Uses], 1834 (Greece); see also Nomos (1932:5351) arts. 61–62 O 
nomos Arxaiotitwn [The Antiquities Act], 1932 (Greece) (incorporating the 1834 law). 
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marshes, are the property of the State.”22  In Greece, all cultural property, including 
objects in private collections, is regulated by national antiquities laws.23  Similarly, 
Italy’s first patrimony laws—the oldest dating back to 1902, followed by the 1909 
and the landmark 1939 laws—gave the Italian state broad power and exclusive 
competence to regulate cultural heritage.24  The Italian ministry of culture is 
entrusted with the authority to supervise every action involving national cultural 
property, including the power to control excavations, to grant export controls, to 
price objects, to regulate the discovery of archaeological material, to force private 
owners of such objects to restore them at their own expense, and, if of great 
interest, to make them publicly accessible.25  By giving the state the power to 
determine the circulation of cultural property and to impose penalties for 
noncompliance, these patrimony laws have in essence banned the export of ancient 
artifacts for the purpose of being sold on the international market. 
The Italian and Greek state authorities have not manifested any interest in 
trading ancient artifacts; patrimony laws have been used as a tool to retain cultural 
property within the boundaries of the modern nation-state, thereby restricting licit 
trade to categories of cases where such state authorities have granted an export 
permit.26  For instance, the relevant Italian law provides that antiquities belonging 
to public bodies can only be deaccessioned if the ministry of culture agrees and if 
several conditions regarding the proposed use of the work and its state of 
conservation are met.27  The contract of sale will include a list of prescriptions on 
where and how the object shall be kept and exhibited in order to guarantee its 
physical safety, public enjoyment and value enhancement.28  Antiquities belonging 
to private parties can be deaccessioned if similar conditions are met; in each case, 
the ministry must be notified and it can purchase the object for the same price as 
contained in the contract of sale if it chooses to do so within sixty days.29  If a work 
 
 22. Nomos (1932:5351) arts. 61–62 O nomos Arxaiotitwn [The Antiquities Act], 1932 (Greece). 
 23. Id.; see also Nomos (3028:2002) Gia tin prostasia twn Arxaiotitwn kai en genei tis Polistikis 
Klironomias [On the Protection of Antiquities and of the Cultural Heritage in General], 2002 (Greece).  
 24. See Legge 12 giugno 1902, n. 185 (It.); Legge 28 giugno 1909, n. 1364 (It.); L. n. 1089/1939 
(It.).  
 25. L. n. 1089/1939 art. 25 (It.) (“The Minister of Public Education, having consulted with the 
Central Commission for Antiquities and Fine Arts or the Central Commission for Academies and 
Libraries, may authorize the exchange of antiquities or works of art with those belonging to other 
bodies, institutions and private bodies, including foreign bodies, with due prudence as dictated by the 
regulation.”); id. art. 31 (“In the case of a sale for monetary consideration, the Minister of Public 
Education shall have the right to acquire the item at the price established in the sale documentation.”); 
id. art. 36 (“Anyone intending to remove cultural property from the Italian territory must make a 
declaration and submit it to the relevant export office, at the same time indicating the sales value of each 
item.”); id. art. 39 (“[T]he minister of Cultural and Environmental Property or the export office’s region 
may acquire the item for the amount indicated in the claim.”); id. art. 49 (“Accidentally discovered items 
shall be the property of the State.”); id. art. 53 (“The Minister . . . may require private owners of 
immovable items of exceptional interest . . . to allow viewing of the items.”).  
 26. Decreto Legislativo 22 gennaio 2004, n. 42 arts. 55–57 (It.). 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. arts. 57–61. 
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is determined to be of particular importance, the law requires the object to be kept 
on Italian soil even if the buyer is not an Italian national.30  It can eventually be 
exported on a temporary basis if authorization from the ministry is obtained.31  
Similarly, in Greece national antiquities cannot be traded unless the ministry grants 
a permit to sell and export an object.32  Again the Greek ministry of culture is given 
the right to preempt the transfer.33  Overall, both systems rely on ministerial 
permission for deaccession.  Until now, exportation has been very limited, mostly 
involving the sale of privately owned lesser antiquities.34  This narrow flow of 
legitimate objects could not satisfy the international demand for high quality 
ancient artifacts, the rest of which was met by illicitly exported cultural goods.35 
The most important supranational measure to address the illicit trade in cultural 
objects is the 1970 UNESCO Convention, an international treaty that is intended to 
provide a framework for cooperation among nations to combat the illicit trade of 
cultural artifacts.36  The Convention has a standard-setting function; it is not self-
implementing but has to be ratified and transposed into national law before it 
becomes directly applicable.37  This instrument has now been ratified by 120 
countries including the target countries of this Article:  Italy, Greece and the United 
States.38  The Convention urges each of its state parties to identify and protect 
 
 30. Id. art. 54. 
 31. Id. arts. 66–67. 
 32. Nomos (3028:2002) art. 21.1 Gia tin prostasia twn Arxaiotitwn kai en genei tis Polistikis 
Klironomias [On the Protection of Antiquities and of the Cultural Heritage in General], 2002 (Greece) 
(“Moveable ancient monuments dating up to 1453 belong to the State in terms of ownership and 
possession, are imprescriptible and extra commercium”); id. art 28.1 (“The holder of a movable 
monument dating up to 1453 may transfer his possession, after notifying the Service of his intention and 
the personal data of the candidate holder, who shall submit an application for a permit of possession to 
be granted in accordance with the provisions of article 23. The relevant act shall be issued within 
reasonable time.”); id. art. 34.2 (“The export of monuments may be allowed upon permit, provided that 
they are not of special significance to the cultural heritage of the country and the unity of important 
collections shall not be affected”). 
 33. Id. art. 28.5. 
 34. Conversation with Jeanette Papadopoulos, Dir., Mgmt. & Int’l Circulation of the 
Archaeological Heritage, Italian Ministry of Culture, in Rome, It. (July 5, 2012). 
 35. See FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 1–5; ISMAN, supra note 1. 
 36. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, pmbl., arts. 1–7.  Another major international 
convention concerning the regulation of cultural property is the International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 34 I.L.M. 
1322, 1322 (1995) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].  Currently, the UNIDROIT Convention has 
thirty-three state members.  UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.pdf.  The UNIDROIT Convention is not 
thoroughly analyzed here because although the United States played an active role in the drafting stages, 
a brief filed by a large consortium of museums and dealers persuaded the U.S. delegation not to sign it.  
James F. Fitzpatrick, Stealth Unidroit: Is USIA the Villain?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 47, 49 (1998).  
 37. See General Introduction to the Standard-Setting Instruments of UNESCO, UNITED NATIONS 
EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=23772&URL_DO= 
DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). 
 38. The United States participated in the promulgation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and was 
the first major market nation to transpose it into national law when it passed the Convention on Cultural 
Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446, § 300–15, 96 Stat. 2339, 2350–63 (1983) (codified as 
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cultural property present on their territory and to cooperate with other state parties 
in combating the dangers inherent in illicit trading.39  Its main purpose is to achieve 
a more uniform multinational regulation of the international antiquities market and 
to introduce a mechanism facilitating the return of illicitly traded cultural objects to 
the source nations.40  This repatriation mechanism, however, allowed state parties 
to claim back cultural objects based on domestic legislative declarations of 
ownership, thereby increasing the ability of patrimony laws to actually retain 
cultural objects. 
The implementation of the 1970 Convention in the United States is significant to 
the instant inspection of illicit trade on the U.S. market.  The interest in and 
demand for ancient cultural objects from private collectors and museums has made 
the United States one of the largest markets for foreign antiquities.41  Although 
most market participants opposed any regulation that would restrict the 
international trade in antiquities, the lobbying work of archaeologists was 
organized, effective and ultimately successful in persuading the U.S. Congress to 
ratify the Convention, which was implemented into national law by the Cultural 
Property Implementation Act (CPIA) in 1983.42  The CPIA introduced a 
 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13 (2012)).  Kevin F. Jowers, International and National Legal Efforts 
to Protect Cultural Property: The 1970 UNESCO Convention, The United States, and Mexico, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 145, 149, 155 (2003).  Italy did the same with Legge 30 ottobre 1975, no. 873 (It.).  See 
Alessandra Lanciotti, The Dilemma of the Right to Ownership of Underwater Cultural Heritage: The 
Case of the “Getty Bronze,” in CULTURAL HERITAGE, CULTURAL RIGHTS, CULTURAL DIVERSITY: NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 301, 317 n.73 (Silvia Borelli & Federico Lenzerini eds., 
2012).  On December 29, 1980, Greece also ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention with Law No. 
1103/80.  See E. Beriatos, M. Papageorgiou, J. Lainas & Ch. Nikolakopoulou, Sustainable Management 
of Cultural Heritage in Greek Cities and Regions 2 (2011) (presentation paper at the 47th ISOCARP 
Cong.), available at http://www.isocarp.net/Data/case_studies/2055.pdf.  For the full list of state parties’ 
deposit dates of instruments and types of instruments, see Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.  Paris, 14 
November 1970, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., http://portal.unesco.org/ 
la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited Dec 30, 2012).  
 39. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 40. Id. (“Considering that it is incumbent upon every State to protect the cultural property 
existing within its territory against the danger of theft, clandestine excavation, and illicit export, 
considering that, to avert these dangers, it is essential for every State to become increasingly alive to the 
moral obligations to respect its own cultural heritage and that of all nations.”); see also UNESCO, 
RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (1976), 
available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13132&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL 
_SECTION=201.html (“[T]he circulation of cultural property . . . is a powerful means of promoting 
mutual understanding and appreciation among nations . . . a systematic policy of exchanges among 
cultural institutions, by which each would part with its surplus items in return for objects that it lacked, 
would not only be enriching to all parties but would also lead to a better use of the international 
community’s cultural heritage which is the sum of all the national heritages.”) 
 41. ASIF EFRAT, GOVERNING GUNS, PREVENTING PLUNDER: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
AGAINST ILLICIT TRADE 134, 137 (2012). 
 42. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act §§ 300–15; Efrat, supra note 7 
(discussing the lobbying efforts of the archaeologists).  Efrat argues that the Convention was 
implemented as an act of moral leadership, even though it did not offer any gains to the United States as 
a market country.  Id. at 86–87; see also JACK A. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 13–14, 202 (2005) (discussing the interest-based approach to international law). 
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mechanism that allows for the prohibition of the importation of documented 
cultural property into the United States based on bilateral agreements with source 
countries party to the Convention.43  The Act was designed to shield U.S. 
institutions from liability for ownership claims made solely on the grounds of 
foreign patrimony laws by establishing a process of internal review that redefined 
the need and scope of import controls.44  A country party to the Convention can 
formally request that the United States restrict the import of certain defined 
categories of cultural property into its territory.45  Applying for import restrictions 
is a time-consuming process that may take up to several years:  applicants must 
document their nation’s looting problem in great detail, explain what they are 
currently undertaking in order to alleviate it, show that the U.S. market for their 
cultural objects is sizable enough to merit restrictions, and submit a descriptive list 
with defined categories of objects that shall be the subject of import restrictions.46  
By way of example, a segment of the bilateral agreement entered into with Italy in 
2001 restricts the import of “Attic Black Figure, Red Figure and White Ground 
Pottery,” which “are made in a specific set of shapes (amphorae, craters, hydriae, 
oinochoi, kylikes) decorated with black painted figures on a clear clay ground 
(Black Figure), decorative elements in reserve with background fired black (Red 
Figure), and multi-colored figures painted on a white ground (White Ground).”47  
Attic vases are particularly risky objects for a museum to purchase:  a study shows 
that between seventy and eighty percent of them come from Etruria.48  The Cultural 
Property Advisory Committee (CPAC) evaluates applications; import restrictions 
are granted if its eleven members, including archaeologists, museum people, 
experts in the international sale of antiquities and public interest representatives, 
find that the cultural patrimony of a country is in jeopardy from pillage.49  In 
making such a determination, CPAC members are required to take into account 
“the general interest of the international community in the interchange of cultural 
 
 43. See 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(2)(A), (B) (2012). 
 44. See Bator, supra note 14, at 287, 328. 
 45. See 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A)–(D).  “Cultural property” is defined to comprise specified 
categories of “significant archaeological or important ethnological materials” or any other “culturally 
significant” material object that was discovered within a source nation.  Id. § 2601(2), (6).  The language 
of the Act specifically encompasses every object that is “important to the cultural heritage of people 
because of its distinctive characteristics, comparative rarity, or its contribution to the knowledge of the 
origins, development, or history of that people.”  Id. § 2601(2)(C)(ii)(II).  
 46. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(A)–(D), (3); see also Letter from Patty Gerstenblith, President, Lawyers’ 
Comm. for Cultural Heritage Pres., to Cultural Prop. Advisory Comm. (Apr. 22, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
 47. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy and 
Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods, 66 Fed. Reg. 7399, 7401 (Jan. 
23, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 12). 
 48. Conversation with Jeanette Papadopoulos, supra note 34; see also Maria Antonietta Rizzo, 
Gli scavi clandestini a Cerveteri (1982-94), in ANTICHITÀ SENZA PROVENIENZA 15, 24–25 (1995). 
 49. 19 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1)(A)–(D), (f)(1)(A)–(C) (providing for the regulation of CPAC); id. §§ 
2602–03 (stating the criteria) 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, art. 9; see also Steven Vincent, 
Stealth Fighter: The Secret War of Maria Kouroupas, ART & AUCTION 63 (2002). 
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property among nations for scientific, cultural and educational purposes.”50  
Negotiations may last for a long time; for example, it took about ten years before 
Italy and CPAC reached an agreement on the categories to be restricted.51  Once 
approved, the list is published in the Federal Register, and the import restrictions 
are effective from that date.52 
Initially it was thought that source nations could only request import restrictions 
on items of “cultural significance,” but this rule was not necessarily followed and 
the substance of these agreements includes broad categories of items that almost 
resemble a patrimony law.53  It has been argued that the concept of “cultural 
significance” has been substituted for “archeological significance”; this way, 
anything of archaeological interest will be understood to be “culturally significant” 
and returned to its source country.54  Another section of the CPIA states that an 
import restriction can be requested only if the objects are catalogued on the 
inventory of a museum, archaeological site or cultural institution.55  This does not 
restrict the import of objects recently excavated and smuggled across national 
borders, which are of greatest concern for obvious reasons:  first, because recently 
surfaced objects are not listed in any national inventory, and, second, because the 
country of origin would not be listed as the one from which the object was 
excavated, but the one from which it is sold.  Technically, such objects can enter 
the United States notwithstanding the existence of a bilateral agreement.56  Since 
1983 the United States has entered into bilateral agreements limiting the categories 
of objects that can enter its territory with fifteen countries.57  All these agreements 
became effective in the early 2000s, and they allow U.S. customs to seize cultural 
property that has been imported without a valid export certificate.58  No petition to 
restrict imports has ever been rejected by the CPAC, but some have been materially 
delayed.59 
 
 50. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(D); see also id. § 2605(b)(1)(B) (establishing CPAC’s composition as 
a committee composed of eleven members appointed by the President to renewable three-year terms, 
with the following profiles: two members represent the interests of museums; three members are expert 
in archaeology, anthropology, ethnology or related fields; three members are experts in the international 
sale of cultural property; and three members represent the interests of the general public). 
 51. Conversation with Jeanette Papadopoulos, supra note 34. 
 52. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(f)(1). 
 53. Id. § 2601(2)(c)(i)(I). 
 54. Cultural Policy Research Inst., Cultural Property Implementation Act: Is It Working? (Mar. 
21, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.cprinst.org/Home/issues/transcript—-cultural-property-
implementation-act-is-it-working). 
 55. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2607, 2610(2)(a); 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, art. 7 (b)(1);.  Note 
that UNIDROIT art. 3.1 states: “The possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen shall return 
it . . . .”  This is important because it provides for uninventoried objects to be returned, which would 
remedy the present gap. 
 56. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, art. 7(b)(1); 19 U.S.C. §§ 2607, 2610(2)(a). 
 57. Peru, Bolivia, Mali, Cambodia, Columbia, Canada, Italy, Cyprus, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, China, Mali and Greece.  Bilateral Agreements, BUREAU EDUC. & 
CULTURAL AFF., http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/listactions.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).  
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Long-Delayed Chinese Import Restrictions Imposed, CULTURAL PROP. OBSERVER 
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Although the aim of the CPIA was to put into place a system giving CPAC the 
option to create import barriers in certain defined circumstances where the interest 
in retaining culturally significant but unprovenanced objects could be proven under 
clear guidelines, CPAC’s granting of import restrictions to broad categories of 
archaeological material seems to have had the effect of severely limiting the trade 
in antiquities altogether.  This can in part be explained by the fact that CPAC is 
largely staffed by archaeologists and therefore defends their broader interests, but it 
is not in line with the aim and goals envisioned by Congress when it decided to 
ratify the 1970 Convention.60  The aim behind passing the CPIA was to afford 
relief to source nations in certain evident circumstances of crisis where illicit trade 
is a real threat to a country’s cultural heritage, but also to “allow the free flow of 
art, art honestly and honorably acquired, to continue to come to the United 
States.”61  The CPIA was thought to create a safe harbor for a limited selection of 
significant objects, but the way it was implemented transformed it into a blanket 
measure for the return of artifacts to source countries.62 
Instead of stimulating international exchanges and combating illicit trade by 
enabling countries to claim the return of significant cultural objects, this section has 
shown that the 1970 UNESCO Convention has been aiding patrimony laws in 
impeding most legitimate trade in antiquities.  The measures discussed above do 
not provide for a meaningful way to enhance the licit trade in cultural artifacts, and, 
by failing to recognize the utility of the market as a transactional arena, the present 
legal rules ignore the interest of the demand side, which includes the desires of 
dealers, collectors and museums in market nations.  The combined effect of the 
Italian and Greek patrimony laws, the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and its United 
States implementing counterpart has been to discourage international trade and 
reduce the scope of a licit market in cultural objects. 
 
(Jan. 15, 2009), http://culturalpropertyobserver.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/long-delayed-chinese-
import.html. 
 60. Relating to Stolen Archaeological Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Criminal 
Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 4–5 (1985) (statement of Sen. Daniel Moynihan).  
The Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) was enacted only after a long and arduous process of 
compromise that fairly balanced all competing interests.  One part of the compromise which led to the 
unanimous passage of the act––after a decade of effort––was the clear understanding among all 
interests, public and private, that the CPIA would establish the definitive national policy regarding the 
importation of cultural objects and that any inconsistent provisions of law would be brought into accord.  
Id. (statement of Sen. Daniel Moynihan). 
 61. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l 
Trade of the S. Comm. of Fin., 95th Cong. 69 (1978) (statement of Oscar White Muscarella, Chairman, 
Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Archaeological Institute of America). 
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the CPIA but 
convicting a private dealer under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), which prohibits the 
transportation of goods known to have been stolen).  Although this case bypasses the statutory 
requirements set out in the CPIA by using the NSPA, the “Schultz doctrine” has never been applied in 
the case of a state action for restitution.  It would also be difficult to prove the scienter requirement of 
the NSPA.  The recognition and enforcement of restrictions to the international trade in cultural property 
has been termed the “blank check rule.”  See Bator, supra note 14, at 354.  
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B.  ANALYSIS OF THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL PROPERTY AND ANTIQUES 
As artifacts started to be sold on the black market, the legal restrictions affecting 
the trade in cultural objects lead to the growth of an illicit trade.63  Illicit trade came 
into existence because there was a strong demand on the side of wealthy museums 
and collectors all around the world for objects that were prohibited from being sold 
in lawful markets since the 1970 UNESCO Convention was negotiated.  A black 
market arose because of restrictions and prohibitions on licit markets and the 
tightening of the legal regime beginning in the 1970s that regulates the import of 
cultural material, which automatically diminished the supply of legitimately 
tradable objects.64  Artifacts sold on the black market are typically excavated from 
the soil of source nations by local looters, then passed on to middlemen, smuggled 
across borders and resold until they reach global dealers that have direct contacts 
with collectors and curators of important museums.65  These global dealers usually 
operate from countries with lax export restrictions on cultural material, like the 
United Kingdom or Switzerland.66  The looting of objects that find their way to 
museums often involves the destruction of large numbers of lesser items and the 
loss of scientific knowledge that comes with a preserved context.67  There are 
several levels of due diligence that should be complied with before acquiring an 
ancient artifact, and an attentive analysis of these steps would often reveal whether 
the object in question could have been illicitly excavated.  However, potential 
acquirers often choose not to inquire too closely about provenance as a way to 
avoid direct confrontation with the legal and ethical repercussions that knowledge 
of illicit trade entails.68  The willingness to buy remained so strong that due 
diligence steps were bypassed, transactions became blurred, documents outlining 
provenance were faked and all sorts of schemes were devised to ensure that the 
black market in antiquities would thrive.69  These arrangements worked well during 
the 1970s, the 1980s and part of the 1990s, but with the new millennium, source 
 
 63. Bator, supra note 14, at 317.  Bator argues that a system of total embargo would fail because 
a complete prohibition in trade would lead to the emergence of a black market fed by illicit trade.  Id. at 
318–19; see also J. David Murphy, The People’s Republic of China and the Illicit Trade in Cultural 
Property: Is the Embargo Approach the Answer?, 3 INT’L. J. CULTURAL PROP. 227, 234 (1994). 
 64.  See Neil Brodie, Introduction to ARCHAEOLOGY, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE 
ANTIQUITIES TRADE 1, 5–6 (Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2006); Colin Renfrew, Museum Acquisitions: 
Responsibility for the Illicit Traffic in Antiquities in Illegal Antiquities, in ARCHAEOLOGY, CULTURAL 
HERITAGE AND THE ANTIQUITIES TRADE, supra, at  245, 245–56. 
 65. See FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 1–5; ISMAN, supra note 1. 
 66. See FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 171; ISMAN, supra note 1. 
 67. NEIL BRODIE ET AL., STEALING HISTORY: THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL MATERIAL 9 
(McDonald Inst. ed., 2000). 
 68. Id. at 8–10 (defining provenance as “[t]he full history and ownership of an item from the time 
of its discovery or creation to the present day, from which authenticity and ownership is determined”); 
but see INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS § 2.3 (2006), available at 
http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Codes/code_ethics2013_eng.pdf. 
 69. FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1; see also ISMAN, supra note 1; PETER WATSON & 
CECILIA TODESCHINI, THE MEDICI CONSPIRACY: THE ILLICIT JOURNEY OF LOOTED ANTIQUITIES, FROM 
ITALY’S TOMB RAIDERS TO THE WORLD’ S GREATEST MUSEUMS (Public Affairs ed., 2006). 
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nations started to pursue the return of illicitly imported artifacts more vigorously.70  
The peak was reached when prominent art dealers as well as the curator of one of 
the world’s most important museums were criminally prosecuted.71  The following 
section illustrates the scope of the black market and argues that the presence of 
illicit trade can be proved empirically. 
As data sets on illegal activities are by their nature hard to obtain, it is very 
difficult to offer precise figures on the full extent of the illicit trade in cultural 
artifacts; available estimates range from a global total of $300 million to $6 billion 
each year, but it is unclear how these estimates were calculated.72  A study by 
economists Fisman and Wei suggests that the illicit trade in cultural property can be 
empirically analyzed by looking at reported figures on imports and exports of 
cultural objects and by taking advantage of different reporting incentives between 
source and market countries.73  The legal systems in source countries like Italy and 
Greece regulate the export of ancient objects:  exporting these objects requires an 
export permit and customs will retain objects without the required documentation.74  
Beyond the logistical problems with guarding archaeological sites and enforcing 
export laws, looters are encouraged to smuggle antiquities across national borders 
without declaring them by the small incentives to report finds to the authorities, 
compared with the high profitability of antiquities on the black market.75  However, 
the moment a smuggled artifact is outside its source country, it ceases to be a good 
extra commercium and becomes tradable in a market country like the U.S.—absent 
 
 70. WATSON & TODESCHINI, supra note 69, at 20 (explaining that source countries’ pursuits 
started when the Geneva storeroom of antiquities dealer Giacomo Medici was raided by the Carabinieri 
and the Swiss police); see also VERNON SILVER, THE LOST CHALICE 175 (2009) (explaining that the 
official report of the contents of Medici’s storerooms was submitted in July 1999, and since then it has 
been used as evidence in restitution claims). 
 71. SILVER, supra note 70, at 194; WATSON & TODESCHINI, supra note 69, at 165. 
 72. See ROGER ATWOOD, STEALING HISTORY: TOMB RAIDERS, SMUGGLERS, AND THE LOOTING 
OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 221 (2004); see also Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting 
and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 377–78 (1995); Neil Brodie, Statistics, 
Damned Statistics, and the Antiquities Trade, 73 ANTIQUITY 447, 447 (1999); Alia Szopa, Hoarding 
History: A Survey of Antiquity Looting and Black Market Trade, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 55, 75 
(2004) (“The stolen art market is an industry estimated to be worth between two and six billion 
dollars.”). 
 73. Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of Smuggling: 
Uncovering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property and Antiques, 1 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 82–96 
(2009).  Fisman and Wei’s paper’s contribution lies in finding a correlation between the measure of the 
illicit trade in cultural goods and survey-based corruption indices. 
 74. See generally discussion supra Part I.A.  See also Decreto Legislativo 22 gennaio 2004, n. 42 
art. 65 (It.); Nomos (3028:2002) art. 32.2 Gia tin prostasia twn Arxaiotitwn kai en genei tis Polistikis 
Klironomias [On the Protection of Antiquities and of the Cultural Heritage in General], 2002 (Greece); 
Council Directive 93/7, Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a 
Member State, 1993 O.J. (L 74) 74 (EC) (providing for the return of illicitly exported artifacts); Council 
Regulation 3911/92, Export of Cultural Goods, 1992 O.J. (L 395) 1 (EC) (requiring the presentation of 
an export license for the cultural goods to be exported outside the EU).  
 75. See Sue J. Park, The Cultural Property Regime in Italy: An Industrialized Source Nation’s 
Difficulties in Retaining and Recovering its Antiquities, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 931, 931–32 (2002). 
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detailed references in bilateral agreements under the 1970 Convention.76  If the 
cultural object in question is not covered by a bilateral agreement, it will not be 
regarded as illicit when imported into a market nation and can enter the market 
country legally once its value has been declared to customs.77  Traditionally, the 
U.S. has not required records of ownership history or identification of the vendor.78  
The United States also provides positive incentives to declare the import of cultural 
objects upon entry by not taxing properly imported goods; this, coupled with the 
potential for seizure in case of an improper declaration, provides a strong incentive 
to declare the import.79  Considering the incentive system, but also the fact that 
people regularly understate the value of imported objects to expedite the customs 
processes and attract less attention, reported U.S. import values are likely 
conservative estimates, but still indicative figures of antiquities entering the United 
States.  Taking into account the different reporting incentives in source versus 
market countries, a measure of the illicit trade in cultural goods can be generated by 
comparing the difference between a given measure of imports of cultural material 
recorded by customs in the United States and the measure of exports of the same 
material recorded by customs authorities in source countries.  If the imports 
reported by one country roughly coincide with exports reported by its trading 
partner, the trade would be transparent and legal.  Minor differences could be 
explained by differing terms of valuation, timing of the reports, and inconsistencies 
in including or excluding particular items in broader categories.  On the other hand, 
a significant discrepancy in reported imports and exports would signal the presence 
of illicit movements. 
The following discussion applies the above analysis to the import/export data 
provided by the U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics Database.80  This database 
contains import/export data on commodities organized by calendar year.  For the 
purpose of this Paper, the data provides an overview of the annual value in U.S. 
dollars of exports and imports of works of art starting in 1995.  For each reported 
 
 76. Fisman & Wei, supra note 73, at 83. 
 77. See Bator, supra note 14, at 343 n.117; see also U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 
WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW ABOUT: 
WORKS OF ART, COLLECTOR’S PIECES, ANTIQUES, AND OTHER CULTURAL PROPERTY (2006), available 
at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/legal/informed_compliance_pubs/icp061.ctt/icp061.pdf; 
E-mail from James McAndrew, Former Senior Special Agent, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to author 
(July 5, 2012) (on file with author).  For court discussion of this point, see, for example, Att’y Gen. of 
New Zealand v. Ortiz [1982] 3 All E.R. 432 (A.C.), aff’d, [1983] 2 All E.R. 93 (H.L.) (U.K.), reprinted 
in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ALBERT E. ELSEN & STEPHEN K. URICE, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL 
ARTS 247–51 (2007). 
 78. Morag Kersel, From the Ground to the Buyer A Market Analysis of the Trade in Illegal 
Antiquities, in ARCHAEOLOGY, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE ANTIQUITIES TRADE, supra note 64, at 
188, 194.  
 79. Id.; see also United States v. Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 80. Availability Result: 9706, UNITED NATIONS COMMODITY TRADE STAT. DATABASE, 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/daCommoditiesResults.aspx?px=H1&cc=9706 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); 
Availability Result: 9705, UNITED NATIONS COMMODITY TRADE STAT. DATABASE, 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/daCommoditiesResults.aspx?px=H1&cc=9705 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
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year, import values for specific categories containing antiquities in market nations 
can be compared to the export values of the same objects exported by source 
countries.  The most relevant categories for this purpose in the database are HS 
9705, which includes collections and collectors’ pieces of various types, and HS 
9706, which covers antiques older than one hundred years.81  James McAndrew, an 
expert on the illicit trade in artifacts and customs procedures, confirms that even 
though HS 9705 corresponds to the import of antiquities better than HS 9706, U.S. 
Customs will accept both.82  These classifications are not ideal because they both 
contain more than just cultural artifacts of ancient civilizations, including non-
cultural artifact entries.  However, the combination of both categories should cover 
virtually all antiquities imported by the U.S. 
Upon entry in the United States, importers are required to fill out customs form 
7501.83  The form asks for the value, i.e., the price paid for the item, the exporting 
country and the country of origin of the object.84  For customs purposes, country of 
origin is defined as “country of manufacture, production, or growth of any 
article”—terms not relative to the antiquities trade.85  No reference is made to the 
possibility of the country of origin being unknown.86  The UNESCO Convention 
and the CPIA refer to the place of excavation (licit or illicit), but such a definition 
is not a legal one.87  Even though customs makes the country of origin declaration a 
material fact, this information is often impossible for the importer to know.88  As 
long as the form is completed with accuracy and to the best of the importer’s 
knowledge, the burden of proof falls on the claimant country to prove that the 
antiquity was excavated from a location within their modern day boundaries and 
that when this occurred there was a patrimony law in place covering the items.89  It 
seems that unless there is a false statement the item will be imported legally90 
 
 81. HS 9705 comprises collections and collectors’ pieces of zoological, botanical, mineralogical, 
anatomical, historical, archaeological, paleontological, ethnographic or numismatic interest.  Commodity 
List, UNITED NATIONS COMMODITY TRADE STAT. DATABASE, http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/ 
rfCommoditiesList.aspx?px=H1&cc=9705 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).  HS 9706 and HS 9705 are 
subcategories of HS 9700, which comprises “works of art, collectors pieces’ and antiques.”  Id. 
 82. E-mail from James McAndrew, supra note 77. 
 83. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CBP FORM 7501: ENTRY 
SUMMARY (2009), available at http://forms.cbp.gov/pdf/cbp_form_7501.pdf. 
 84. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (2012).  
 85. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CBP FORM 7501 
INSTRUCTIONS (2012) available at http://forms.cbp.gov/pdf/7501_instructions.pdf; see also E-mail from 
James McAndrew, supra note 77. 
 86. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, supra note 85.  
 87. 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2)(C); 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(c); see also E-mail 
from James McAndrew, supra note 77. 
 88. United States v. Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1997). In 
this case, the United States successfully sued for civil forfeiture of an antique gold platter.  The incorrect 
identification of the place of origin by the platter’s purchaser was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 542, which 
prohibits importation of goods “by means of false statements.”  Id. at 228–30.  The object in question 
came from Italy, but the importation form falsely listed the work’s country of origin as Switzerland.  Id.  
 89. Id.; see also United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 405 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 90. See Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222. 
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To begin the analysis of the differences between reported import and export 
values, the declared export values of HS 9705 and HS 9706 into the United States 
for two source countries, Italy and Greece, will be compared to the declared import 
value of the same categories (HS 9705 and HS 9706) into the United States.91  
These two numbers illustrate the reporting discrepancy. However, they will not 
determine the value of the black market in antiquities since subtracting the values 
of the exports from the value of the U.S. imports as reported on the y axis of the 
tables below will include inaccuracies for which it is difficult to account.92  Instead 
they will enable us to to compare the gap between the export and import values of 
the same goods in two countries that have differing interests in the trade of cultural 
objects:  the United States would like to have them circulate, whereas Greece and 
Italy are in favor of retaining their cultural artifacts.  This comparison identifies 
elements that may signal the presence of illicit trading in these goods. 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below illustrate the gaps between the exports recorded in 
Italy and Greece respectively based on the value of recorded imports of the same 
objects (HS 9705 and HS 9706) into the United States. 
 
 
 91. The following selections were made for the analysis: classification: HS1996; commodities: 
9706 (antiques older than one hundred years); reporters: Italy, Greece, United States; partners: Italy, 
Greece, United States; years: 1996–2010; trade flows: import/export. 
 92. Besides certain limitations with the dataset, see Read Me First (Disclaimer), UNITED 
NATIONS COMMODITY TRADE STAT. DATABASE, http://comtrade.un.org/db/help/uReadMeFirst.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013), the following other factors contribute to inaccurate results.  First, restrictions 
in the legal regime, the entering of bilateral agreements, and specific increase or decrease of the demand 
for cultural objects alter their value, which will be reflected in the total value of goods entering the 
United States according the above dataset.  Second, by selecting the country in the search, it is assumed 
that the items included are of local origin when this is not always the case.  Third, Customs and Border 
Protection regulations require the submission of the country of origin of the merchandise, not the place 
of discovery, whereas CPIA refers to the place of discovery.  Customs and Border Protection has never 
issued any written guidance addressing how importers of cultural property should deal with this 
inconsistency.  
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Figure 1.1:  Annual value of exports from Italy to the United States of categories 
HS 9705 and HS 9706 and annual value for imports to the United States from Italy 
of the same categories. 
 
 
Figure 1.2:  Annual value of exports from Greece to the United States of categories 
HS 9705 and HS 9706 and annual value for imports to the United States from 
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Figures 1.1 and 1.2 indicate the yearly total value in U.S. dollars of the declared 
export of cultural material (HS 9705 and HS 9706) from Italy and Greece to the 
United States and its counterpart, the U.S. import of cultural material coming from 
Italy and Greece.  The results are significant because the gaps are extremely large.  
This means that even though the definitions of categories HS 9705 and HS 9706 
are broader than the focus of this analysis and include objects other than classical 
antiquities, the reality is that exports of HS 9705 and HS 9706 materials are 
consistently underreported to the point where for most years the reported export 
value in Greece is zero.  In both figures, the reported export values are extremely 
low compared to the U.S. import counterpart.  As noted above, in 2001 the United 
States entered into a bilateral agreement with Italy that established import controls 
for certain categories of cultural objects.93  This fact deserves closer attention 
because Figure 1.1 shows that entering into this agreement resulted in an increase 
of recorded exports.  This point suggests that such agreements do have an effect in 
combating illicit trade; however, given their narrow focus on inventoried 
archaeological material and the small sample size, it is difficult to say how 
significant these results are.  The bilateral agreement between the United States and 
Greece was only finalized in December 2011; therefore it is not yet possible to 
compare results.94 
Overall, the findings confirm the presence of an activity which is unrecorded on 
the export side.  Exports of ancient works of art are not being communicated to the 
authorities, when, in accordance with the patrimony laws, this should be the case.  
Again, the aim of this analysis is not to develop a tool that enables the 
measurement of illicit trade, and even though this data does not make it possible to 
measure the volume of illicitly traded objects in a rigorous way, it does highlight 
important issues.  It provides a framework for understanding the reporting issues 
associated with the trade in cultural property in countries with different interests.  
Based on the above data, the gaps between recorded imports and exports signal the 
presence of illegal activity that can be explained by the high demand and 
 
 93. See Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy and 
Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods, 66 Fed. Reg. 7399, 7401 (Jan. 
23, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 12).  The Memorandum of Understanding between the United 
States of America and Italy had an initial duration of five years and was renewed in 2006 and 2011.  See 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Italy 
Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Categories of Archaeological Material 
Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods of Italy, U.S.-It., Jan. 19, 2001 
[hereinafter 2001 U.S.-Italy Memorandum of Understanding], available at http://eca.state.gov/ 
files/bureau/it2001mou.pdf; Italy, BUREAU EDUC. & CULTURAL AFF., http://eca.state.gov/cultural-
heritage-center/international-cultural-property-protection/bilateral-agreements/italy (last visited Feb. 10, 
2013). 
 94. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States and the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Categories of 
Archaeological and Byzantine Ecclesiastical Ethnological Material through the 15th Century A.D. of the 
Hellenic Republic, U.S.-Greece, July 17, 2011, available at http://eca.state.gov/files/bureau/ 
gr2011mou.pdf. 
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diminishing supply of legitimate artifacts. 
How vibrant an underground market is usually depends on the penalties 
associated with the activity in question.  In Italy, the penalties associated with illicit 
export of cultural material used to be regulated by a 1939 law, which mandated 
imprisonment up to four years and a fine of approximately 2,000 Euro.95  In 2004, 
the fine grew to approximately 5,000 Euro.96  Very recent developments include 
the approval by the Italian Council of Ministers of a law in 2011 that further 
increases the maximum penalty to a maximum of six years’ imprisonment and a 
30,000 Euro fine.97  Although the penalties are not lenient, the gap between import 
and export values and the systematic reporting of high entry values for imported 
Italian material suggests that the penalties are inadequate deterrents.  This can best 
be explained first by the tight limitation period to pursue such a claim:  under 
Italian law, the statute of limitations for an illicit export case is seven years.98  
Additionally, it is very difficult to prove when an object was removed from the 
ground in the context of clandestine excavations; this severely limits the 
prosecutable cases to the small number where looters are caught and arrested on the 
spot.  In Greece, the illegal excavation and export of cultural material is punished 
by a prison term of up to ten years.99  On the import side, in the United States if 
illicitly imported objects are caught by the CPIA, the claim results in civil 
forfeiture.100  However, if the scienter requirement of the National Stolen Property 
Act can be proved, its criminal penalties apply; this happened in the seminal case of 
United States v. Schultz, where the trial court imposed a thirty-three month prison 
sentence on an American dealer for knowingly importing illicitly excavated 
antiquities from Egypt.101 
To highlight the significance of the above results, the same data is measured 
with reference to the United Kingdom and Switzerland, two countries with rather 
lenient system of export control.102  Both countries have been reluctant to curtail 
their well-established markets for ancient artifacts, which are profitable and 
legitimate under their respective laws.103  In fact, archaeological material coming 
from other countries has actively been sold on the United Kingdom and Swiss 
markets, and, given the legitimacy of this trade, there is very little incentive for 
 
 95. Legge 1 guigno 1939, n. 1089 art. 66 (It.). 
 96. Legge 22 gennaio 2004, n. 42 art. 174 (It.). 
 97. Legge 21 novembre 2011, n. 3016 (It.) (draft bill). 
 98. Legge 5 dicembre 2005, n. 251 (It.); see also ISMAN, supra note 1, at 195. 
 99. Nomos (3028:2002) art. 61, 63 Gia tin prostasia twn Arxaiotitwn kai en genei tis Polistikis 
Klironomias [On the Protection of Antiquities and of the Cultural Heritage in General], 2002 (Greece). 
 100. 19 U.S.C. § 2609 (2012). 
 101. See National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15 (2012); United States v. Schultz, 
333 F.3d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 102. CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 192–
94(2010).  For the U.K. specifically, see CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT COMMITTEE, CULTURAL 
PROPERTY: RETURN AND ILLICIT TRADE, 1999-2000, H.C. 372-I (U.K.), available at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/371/37102.htm 
 103. FORREST, supra note 102, at 192–94. 
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these countries not to report exports.104  Figures 1.3 and 1.4, below, show that the 
United Kingdom and Switzerland are two of the top exporters and importers of 
antiquities and that the majority of exports are reported to customs. 
 
 
Figure 1.3:  UN ComTrade overview values for HS 9705.105 
 
 
Figure 1.4:  UN ComTrade overview values for HS 9706.106 
 
 104. See Neil Brodie, Britannia Waives the Rules?  The Licensing of Archaeological Material for 
Export from the United Kingdom, in ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE THEFT OF CULTURE AND THE 
EXTINCTION OF ARCHAEOLOGY 185, 189 (Neil Brodie & Kathryn W. Tubb eds., 2001). 
 105. Comtrade Explorer – Snapshot: 9705, UNITED NATIONS COMMODITY TRADE STAT. 
DATABASE, http://comtrade.un.org/db/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?px=H1&cc=9705 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
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Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show the results for the United Kingdom and Switzerland 
from the same exercise undertaken above, comparing United States import values 
with the Swiss and British export values for categories HS 9705 and HS 9706.  
Although the values never match perfectly, the gaps are considerably smaller than 
the gaps that result in the cases of Italy and Greece.  The trade of cultural goods is 
regulated at European Union (EU) level by a Council Regulation, which requires 
any person who intends to export cultural goods from the EU to any other 
destination to obtain a license.107  Such export licenses are issued by designated 
agencies, in each individual member state, that have the competence to decide what 
objects can be classified as “cultural goods.”108  This means that this EU instrument 
is subject to different degrees of control reflecting national approaches to cultural 
property.  No uniform export system can exist as long as EU Member States 
maintain different notions with regards to cultural property.109  The impact of 
national laws and policies is reflected in the different outcome of the figures above:  
for Greece and Italy, which have an export regime based on prohibition, the 
reported export values are very low, contrasted with the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland where they are much higher. 
 
 
 106. Comtrade Explorer – Snapshot: 9706, UNITED NATIONS COMMODITY TRADE STAT. 
DATABASE, http://comtrade.un.org/db/ce/ceSnapshot.aspx?px=H1&cc=9706 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).   
 107. Council Regulation 116/2009, art. 2, 2009 O.J. (L 39) 1 (EC).  
 108. List of Authorities Empowered to Issue Export Licenses for Cultural Goods, 2012 O.J. (C 72) 
29, available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/customs_controls/ 
cultural_goods/list_authorities_en.pdf.   
 109. See IRINI STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND RESTITUTION: A COMMENTARY TO 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW 120 (Evangelos Kyriakidis ed., 2011). 
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Figure 1.5: Annual value of exports from the United Kingdom to the United States 
of categories HS 9705 and HS 9706 and annual value for imports to the United 
States from the United Kingdom of the same categories.110 
 
 110. To further test the dataset for accuracy, I did undertake a comparative analysis using reported 
imports and exports values for toys (HS 9503).  Economists Fisman and Wei also chose toys to test their 
analysis because toys also have a zero tariff rate in the United States and there is no incentive to not 
report their entry.  Fisman & Wei, supra note 73, at 83.  For the purpose of this Paper the same analysis 
is applied over fifteen years (1996 – 2011), and although the U.S. import records are usually higher than 
the export records for Italy and Greece, the percentage of the difference in the gap never exceeds twenty 
percent.  When considering cultural objects, i.e., HS 9705 and HS 9706 objects, the difference in the gap 
was almost always above ninety-five percent as the tables for Italy and Greece show.  This proves that 
the above results cannot be explained by poor customs records in Italy and Greece, since this would 
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Figure 1.6:  Annual value of exports from Switzerland to the United States of 
categories HS 9705 and HS 9706 and annual value for imports to the United States 
from Switzerland of the same categories. 
 
The above empirical analysis shows that the problem of illicit trafficking is a 
concrete one and that the restrictive legal regimes governing the trade in Italian and 
Greek artifacts exacerbate, rather than limit, these activities.  It is worth noting that 
Italy, a source nation that has been suffering the effects of plundering of its 
archaeological sites for a long time, has been a major player in terms of prosecuting 
and actively seeking the restitution of illicitly traded artifacts.111  In addition to a 
group of prosecutors specialized in cultural property crimes and a police force for 
the protection of Italian cultural heritage, the Comando Carabinieri Tutela 
Patrimonio Culturale, Italian law prescribes a positive obligation to prosecute 
when there is evidence of a crime (compared to the United States where the state 
has the option not to prosecute upon finding evidence of a crime).112  At the end of 
the 1990s, the Carabinieri raided a warehouse in Geneva where thousands of 
illegally exported antiquities were stored.113 The owner, Giacomo Medici, an 
 
 111. For example, Italy has prosecuted both Marion True, see Trib. Roma, 13 ottobre 2010, n. 
19360/10 (It.) (on file with author), and Giacomo Medici, see App. Roma, 16 luglio 2009, n. 5359 (It.) 
(on file with author). 
 112. On the role of the Carabinieri, see Lt. Col. Alberto Deregibus, The Carabinieri Headquarters 
for the Protection of Cultural Heritage: Tasks, Activities and International Cooperations, in 
INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON ILLICIT TRAFFIC OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 149, 149–53 (Jeannette 
Papadopoulos ed., 2011).  On the positive obligation to prosecute, see Ildiko P. DeAngelis, Italian 
Prosecutor Paolo Ferri in Rome, Italy, March 2007 Interview, in YEARBOOK OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
LAW 11, 13 (Sherry Hutt & David Tarler eds., 2008). 
 113. Suzan Mazur, The Medici Go-Round: Sotheby’s & the Signed Euphronios, SCOOP INDEP. 
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antiquities dealer of international fame, was arrested in 1997 and sentenced by a 
tribunal in Rome to ten years in prison and a fine of 10 million Euros for dealing in 
stolen ancient artifacts.114  Evidence acquired from the investigation of Medici 
enabled Italian prosecutors to attempt to indict Marion True, the former senior 
curator at the antiquities department at the Getty Villa, as well as art dealer Robert 
Hecht, for conspiracy to traffic in illicitly traded antiquities.115  In addition, Robin 
Symes, a well-known antiquities dealer based in London, declared bankruptcy; a 
court is currently assessing Italy’s claim to some of the artifacts in his 
possession.116  At the time this Article was written, a criminal trial against Michael 
Padgett, Princeton’s antiquities curator, is being pursued.117  Although some of the 
claims against Hecht and True were later dropped because the Italian statute of 
limitations had expired,118 the Medici trial was of pivotal importance in uncovering 
the schemes devised to buy illicitly traded artifacts.119  It enabled the Carabinieri 
and the Italian prosecutorial team to detect the connections that sometimes exist 
between museums and the trade of illicit antiquities.120  These developments turned 
into highly publicized scandals and raised serious concerns about purchases by U.S. 
museums, for the acquisition of illicitly traded material severely undermined their 
trustworthiness, their goal to serve the public, and their commitment to the value of 
education.121  Altogether, these events had the effect of further slowing down the 
art market for antiquities and motivating several of the United States’ largest and 
most prestigious institutions to return several significant objects in their antiquities 
collections with doubtful provenance to their respective source countries.122  The 
dynamics of the market for antiquities and the repatriation of such objects to source 
countries will be analyzed in the next section. 
 
 114. Id.; see also SILVER, supra note 70, at 214. 
 115. Trib. Roma, 13 ottobre 2010, n. 19360/10 (It.) (on file with author); see also Andrew L. 
Slayman, The Trial in Rome, ARCHAEOLOGY (Feb. 6, 2006), 
http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/italytrial/. 
 116.  Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, Deputy State Attorney for Italy (Mar. 27, 
2012); see also Colin Renfrew, Combating the Illicit Antiquities Trade: Progress and Problems, 
UFFICIO STUDI MINISTERO PER I BENI E LE ATTIVITÀ CULTURALI (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www. 
ufficiostudi.beniculturali.it/mibac/export/UfficioStudi/sito-UfficioStudi/Contenuti/Archivio-
Newsletter/Archivio/2010/Newsletter-2/visualizza_asset.html_1712427011.html. 
 117. Jason Felch, Turkey Targets Getty, Other Museums, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2012, at A1; see 
also Tag Archives: Michael Padgett, CHASING APHRODITE, http://chasingaphrodite.com/tag/michael-
padgett/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
 118. Trib. Roma, 13 ottobre 2010, n. 19360/10 (It.) (on file with author); see also Bruce Weber, 
Robert Hecht, Antiquities Dealer, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A18. 
 119. App. Roma, 16 luglio 2009, n. 5359 (It.) (on file with author). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Code of Ethics for Museums, AM. ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS (2000), http://www.aam-
us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics-for-museums (“As nonprofit 
institutions, museums comply with applicable local, state, and federal laws and international 
conventions, as well as with the specific legal standards governing trust responsibilities.  . . . [T]hey 
must take affirmative steps to maintain their integrity so as to warrant public confidence.  They must act 
not only legally but also ethically.”).  
 122. FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 307. 
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II.  IMPACT OF ILLEGAL TRADE ON THE COLLECTING STRATEGIES 
OF MAJOR U.S. MUSEUMS 
This section analyzes the impact of the inefficient legal regime and the resulting 
indications of illicit trade on the collecting strategies of major U.S. museums.  The 
problems in this area of law make it difficult for museums to continue to acquire 
legitimate ancient artifacts on the international market.  The impact of illicit trade 
on collecting strategies of museums will be measured by inspecting the trends in 
antiquities acquisitions and by looking at the consequences of repatriations of 
significant artifacts. 
The discussion that follows will refer to the experience of three U.S. institutions 
that host important classical antiquities collections:  the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art (“Met”), the Getty Villa (“Getty”) and the Princeton University Art Museum 
(“Princeton Museum”).  These three institutions were selected because, aside from 
having very active antiquities departments and outstanding antiquities collections, 
they all have returned artifacts and have undertaken contractual cooperation with 
source countries including Italy and Greece.123  The data utilized to assess the 
trends in antiquities acquisitions has a qualitative and quantitative component.  The 
quantitative component refers to data on acquisitions from the annual reports or 
other official publications of each institution.124  The qualitative component refers 
to interviews conducted with museum officials about existing and future collecting 
strategies.125  First, this section will examine the available collecting strategies and 
how antiquities collections of the above institutions grew over the past thirty years.  
Next, it will inspect the institutions’ recently adopted acquisition policies and their 
effect on acquisitions.  Finally, this section will look at the frequency of claims that 
arose in connection with illegally exported objects, and analyze the cooperation 
agreements that regulated the repatriations, with special attention paid to whether 
the losses of repatriated objects were compensated with loans. 
A.  COLLECTING ANTIQUITIES:  AVAILABLE ROUTES AND HOW COLLECTIONS 
INCREASED OVER TIME 
The collections of most U.S. art museums consist of objects donated to them by 
 
 123. See Agreement, Metropolitan Museum of Art-It., Feb. 21, 2006, reprinted in 14 INT’L J. 
CULTURAL PROP. 427, 427–34 (2006) [hereinafter Met-Italy Agreement]; Press Release, The Getty 
Trust, The Italian Ministry of Culture and the J. Paul Getty Museum Sign Agreement in Rome (Aug. 1, 
2007), available at http://www.getty.edu/news/press/center/statement06_getty_italiancultureministry. 
html.  
 124. See generally Acquisitions, J. PAUL GETTY MUSEUM J. (1983–1986); Acquisitions, GETTY 
TRUST ANN. REP. (1987–2010); Departmental Accessions, ANN. REP. TRUSTEES METROPOLITAN 
MUSEUM OF ART (1983–2008); Acquisitions of the Princeton University Art Museum, REC. ART 
MUSEUM, PRINCETON U. (1983–2007). 
 125. See Conversation with Claire Lyons, Senior Antiquities Curator, J. Paul Getty Museum, in 
L.A., Cal. (Nov. 10, 2011); see also Conversation with James Steward, Dir., Princeton Art Museum, in 
Princeton, N.J. (Dec. 1, 2011); see also Conversation with Sharon Cott, General Counsel of the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 20, 2012). 
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collectors or purchased with monetary gifts from supporters.  Purchases and 
donations are the primary avenues through which antiquities departments have 
continued exhibiting new objects and linked them to recent scholarship and 
innovative curatorial ideas.  Acquisitions through the market generally include 
transactions with auction houses, dealers and private collectors.  When a museum is 
making decisions regarding an acquisition, the emphasis should be placed on 
proper due diligence in order to ensure the provenance of the object; this is easier if 
the object in question has been sold on the market before and relevant records 
prove past transactions, but harder if there is no searchable record.126  Museums 
also rely heavily on donations to fill out their collections.  The level of due 
diligence required to accept a donation was previously lower than for a purchase, 
but now it typically requires the same scrutiny.127  If the quality of a donation, 
measured in terms of aesthetics and documentation, does not meet the standard of a 
given collection, it will be rejected.128 
I will now turn to data on accessions, either through acquisitions or through 
donations, of the three selected institutions in order to assess what impact illicit 
trade and the recent scandals may have had on their buying behavior.  Figure 2.1 
contains a summary of the data showing the number of accessioned antiquities for 
each year by each institution, including both acquisitions through the market and 
donations.  Figure 2.2 contains the same data for acquisitions through the market 
only. 
 
 126. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  Lyons explains that in the past accepting donations was thought to require less rigorous 
due diligence; only recently have the standards been aligned.  Id.; see also FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, 
supra note 1, at 36 (explaining that donations of cultural material have caused problems in the past 
because private collectors acquired objects with doubtful provenance on the market and then donated or 
loaned them to museums thereby skipping adequate levels of due diligence).  Felch and Frammolino 
also explain how the Getty’s former curator Jiri Frel envisioned a donation scheme whereby he 
convinced people he knew to buy and subsequently donate artifacts in return for higher tax deductions.  
Id.  All of the gifts were reported in the museum’s annual 990 tax forms, and most of them were 
published in the J. Paul Getty Museum Journal, the annual catalogue of acquisitions.  Id.  Frel’s 
successor Marion True also succeeded in convincing the Fleischmans to donate part of their notable and 
acclaimed antiquities collection to the Getty by first exhibiting it and putting together a catalogue.  Id.  
This donation was very controversial, as ninety percent of the pieces appear to have unascertained 
provenance.  Id. at 124–34.  An IRS study of tax returns with art donations revealed that 
overvaluations—often at over three times the value of the work—are widespread.  See Jason Felch & 
Doug Smith, Inflated Art Appraisals Cost U.S. Government Untold Millions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2008), 
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-irs2mar02,0,3015698.story.  Between 1973 and 1985, the 
Getty museum received donations altogether valued at $14.7 million.  Id.  
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Figure 2.1 shows the accession trend line of the antiquities departments at the 
Getty, the Met and the Princeton Museum over the past thirty years.130  Accessions 
comprise both purchases and donations.  Two main observations deserve comment.  
First, the trend line of the Getty decreases more sharply in comparison to those of 
the other two museums partly because the Getty is a younger institution (it was 
founded in 1953), and its resources to pursue acquisitions increased sharply with J. 
Paul Getty’s bequest in 1976, thus increasing the pace of acquisitions initially.131  
On the other hand, the Met and the Princeton Museum have had established 
antiquities collection since the beginning of the twentieth century.132  It is 
noteworthy that in the case of the Getty and the Met, the trend lines in both figures 
show a decrease in accessions, compared to Princeton in the first figure there is a 
very modest increase in accessions.  This changes if the data is limited to the 
examination of purchases only (Figure 2.2), where all three trends show a decrease.  
This can be explained by the fact that a university art museum relies more heavily 
on donations than do the other two institutions.133  Overall, the consideration of 
donations here is less important given that the argument is that an inefficient legal 
regime and illicit trade have negatively impacted the ability of U.S. institutions to 
continue collecting antiquities through purchases on the international market.  It is, 
however, instructive to conduct this comparison as it illustrates the interaction 
between donations and acquisitions over time.  It follows that Figure 2.2 is more 
relevant, and it also shows that over the past ten years the levels of acquisitions 
through the art market diminished and remained low—which is of crucial 
importance to the argument of this Article.134  There are multiple explanations for 
this, including the tightening of the market, the extensive restrictions on exports, 
the significant risks of prosecution, and curatorial decisions to buy fewer artifacts 
as a response to shifting institutional practices. 
 
 130. Acquisition levels are reported starting in 1983, since the data on acquisitions by the Getty is 
not accurately reported in official publications before this year.  There are ways to identify acquisition 
patterns for years before 1983, but it would not be as accurate as the set that is presented.  Another 
reason for choosing the 1980s as a starting date to compare acquisition trends is the fact that this decade 
had the highest number of acquisitions that had to be returned to Italy by the Getty.  See Gill & 
Chippindale, From Malibu to Rome, supra note 3, at 206.  
 131. See FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 276, 324.  Felch and Frammolino explain that in 
1939 Getty acquired his first antique object, a terracotta sculpture, at a Sotheby’s auction, and continued 
to collect antiquities for his private personal collection until 1953, and after 1953, every acquisition was 
made on behalf of the museum.  Id. at 276.  By the time of Getty’s death in 1976, the collection included 
approximately 11,000 objects; today, it comprises approximately 44,000.  Id.  According to Getty’s will, 
press accounts and federal tax forms from 1977, the gift to the museum included sixty-four acres of land 
in Malibu worth $3.1 million, an art collection valued at $3.6 million, $17 million in cash and four 
million shares of stock worth $662 million.  Id. at 324. 
 132. Conversation with Sharon Cott, supra note 125; Conversation with James Steward, supra 
note 125. 
 133. Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125. 
 134. Survey Release, Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., Survey Shows Museum Antiquities Purchases 
Are Less than 10% of Global Trade (Feb. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.aamd.org/newsroom/documents/AAMDAntiquitiesSurveyRelease_FINAL. 
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B.  ACQUISITION CODES AND THE CALL FOR PROVENANCE 
Another factor that can explain the decreasing trend in antiquities acquisitions in 
recent years is the enactment of stricter acquisition policies by museums and art 
institutions.  Ethical codes in connection with antiquities acquisitions have existed 
for a long time, but the standards they set out have evolved over time; what is 
considered negligent according to the principles prevailing today used to be 
acceptable in the past, including the recent past.  In particular, the understanding of 
ethical acquisition behavior has shifted over the past decades.  Although the 1970 
UNESCO Convention played a significant role in planting the seeds for improved 
scrutiny of prior ownership documentation, the practice of requiring pre-1970 
documentation did not generally materialize until Italy’s investigations of Medici, 
Hecht and True.  Actual documentation of the place of origin of an artifact is still 
not legally required, as this may sometimes prove impossible to establish; however, 
the call for provenance requirements is not contained in most U.S. institutions’ 
acquisitions codes.135  To illustrate these points, this discussion will refer to the 
code of ethics of the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) and then move 
on to consider recently adopted internal acquisition policies of U.S. museums. 
In the past, ethical codes and acquisition policies drafted by museum 
associations encouraged the making of good faith inquiries into the provenance of 
an object before its acquisition could take place.136  If such provenance could not 
be cleared, the rules required foregoing the transaction, although they did not 
mandate its preclusion.137  One indicative example can be found in the code of 
ethics of the AAMD, which declares that a “director must not knowingly allow to 
be recommended for acquisition—or permit the museum to acquire—any work of 
art that has been stolen . . . or illegally imported into the jurisdiction in which the 
museum is located.”138  Yet even if such statements sound strict, there are gaps.  
Export controls are not specifically mentioned nor is there a precise standard of 
knowledge as to whether an object is stolen.  It could refer to theft in the traditional 
sense and exclude its application to illicitly traded items—and it allows for 
instances where such knowledge is suspected but not established.  Under this 
reading, museum officers could still acquire objects with undocumented 
provenance that may have been removed in violation of a country’s patrimony 
laws.  Finally, there is no penalty associated with noncompliance with the AAMD 
code of ethics, and no action has ever been taken by the AAMD or the U.S. 
 
 135. See BD. OF TRS., J. PAUL GETTY TRUST, POLICY STATEMENT: ACQUISITIONS BY THE J. PAUL 
GETTY MUSEUM (2006), available at http://www.getty.edu/about/governance/pdfs/ 
acquisitions_policy.pdf; see also PRINCETON UNIVERSITY ART MUSEUM, ACQUISITION POLICY (2007) 
(on file with author); Collections Management Policy, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, 
http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/collections-management-policy (last modified Nov. 12, 
2008) (stating the MET’s acquisition policy in section IV). 
 136. FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 88, 181. 
 137. Id. 
 138. ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS 8, 17 (2011), 
available at http://aamd.org/about/documents/2011ProfessionalPracitiesinArtMuseums_000. 
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government against any museum officer for acquiring illicitly traded objects.139 
These loopholes make this and other similar codes and acquisition statements 
weak tools to combat the problem of illicit trade.  Much is still left to the discretion 
of the individual institution, and current practices vary widely.  What should be 
required of antiquities departments is an active investigation into the provenance of 
the object, including all prior available documentation (export permits, sale records, 
inheritance papers, published references, etc.), and strict limitations with regards to 
the acquisition of recently surfaced objects.140  The latest versions of the internal 
acquisition policies of the institutions in question, including the 2006 Getty policy 
statement on acquisitions, the 2007 acquisition policy of the Princeton Museum and 
the 2008 amendments to the collections management policy of the Met, contain 
such provisions and mandate substantial levels of research before making an 
acquisition or accepting a donation.141  These changes seem to have played out 
positively.  The General Counsel of the Met claims that the level of due diligence 
for each acquisition has substantially increased, and in 2010 the Museum of Fine 
Arts (MFA) in Boston hired a curator of provenance to research the origin and 
movements of both objects proposed for acquisition as well as the ones already 
present in the collection.142  In 2008, the AAMD set up a web portal that requires 
museums to file statements in relation to acquisitions that do not meet their 
acquisition policy and explain their reasoning; museums have been complying by 
listing acquisitions and attaching explanations.143  These are welcome changes, 
especially considering the educational role that contemporary museums have 
attached to their collecting role.  It is unfortunate, however, that they became 
effective so late, as it appears that the cut-off date for buying unprovenanced 
 
 139. Id.; see also Lee Rosenbaum, AAMD: A Toothless Watchdog, CULTUREGRRL (June 26, 
2006), http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2006/06/aamd_a_toothless_watchdog.html. 
 140. An orphan is an unprovenanced archaeological object, not necessarily one that recently 
surfaced.  The problem with fostering orphans is an avenue for further research for the following 
reasons.  If the unprovenanced object is documented in the sense that it is catalogued and studied 
although its provenance and context is unknown, this measure would not necessarily help prevent 
looting.  The acquisition and policy statements of the museums mentioned here—and of most museums 
in general—do prohibit their acquisition.  Unless the object does not simply surface from the void, in 
which case the suspicion of it being looted is strong, its owner should trade and keep it, and it should be 
studied and exhibited.  If the studies establish clear provenance, restitution should be the right response.  
By trading an unprovenanced object in the sense described above, the market will allocate it to a safe 
place without encouraging looting.  It would therefore be desirable if reviewed acquisition policies 
recognized the peculiar position of orphans.  See also Press Release, Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., The 
Association of Art Museum Directors Releases New Guidelines on Loans of Antiquities and Ancient Art 
6 (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://aamd.org/papers/documents/Loans_and_PressRelease.pdf 
(discussing developing guidelines for due diligence in the context of loan issuances).  
 141. See BD. OF TRS., J. PAUL GETTY TRUST, supra note 135; Collections Management Policy, 
supra note 135. 
 142. Conversation with Sharon Cott, supra note 125; see also Derek Fincham, A New Museum 
Position: Curator of Provenance, ILLICIT CULTURAL PROP. (Dec. 13, 2011), http://illicit-cultural-
property.blogspot.com/2011/12/new-museum-position-curator-of.html.  
 143. Registry of New Acquisitions of Archaeological Material and Works of Ancient Art, ASS’N OF 
ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, http://aamdobjectregistry.org/Antiquities (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).  
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antiquities became the date of enactment of such internal policies.144 
All the above cited acquisition policies now require proof that the object in 
question was in circulation before 1970 or legally exported after 1970 for it to be 
acquired.145  The significance of 1970 the threshold date for the application of more 
rigorous standards to the acquisition of archaeological material derives from the 
1970 Convention.146  Proving that an antiquity was in circulation before 1970 
requires sale records, catalogues of past exhibitions, publications or other 
documentation acknowledging its existence; it also requires showing either that it 
was outside of its country of origin before 1970 or that it was legally exported after 
that date.147  Archaeologist Colin Renfrew argues that there would be a clear 
benefit in the international community agreeing not to purchase undocumented 
objects excavated before 1970.148  This formulation, he asserts, would no longer 
condone the buying of illicitly exported antiquities prior to that date but would also 
prevent the future acquisition of such objects.149  Even though 1970 has been 
recognized as the boundary date by a number of influential associations, including 
the AAMD,150 the reality is that 1970 is not cited explicitly in any national legal 
measure, which means that at the most it can be regarded as a consensus date.  In 
other words, 1970 is a date to be considered from an ethical point of view.  This 
does not block claims of works of art illicitly exported before 1970, if the 
 
 144. See supra figs. 2.1 & 2.2. 
 145. Collections Management Policy, supra note 135, § IV(D)(3); see also BD. OF TRS., J. PAUL 
GETTY TRUST, supra note 135, at 1. 
 146. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5. 
 147. Renfrew, supra note 116. 
 148. Colin Renfrew, Lecture at City University of New York: Combating the Illicit Antiquities 
Trade: A Time for Everyone (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.savingantiquities.org/our-
work/media/podcasts/colin-renfrew-on-combating-the-illicit-antiquities-trade; see also Renfrew, supra 
note 116 (“For, in theory at least, its [the 1970 date] application should make recently looted antiquities 
completely unsalable.”). 
 149. Renfrew, supra note 116. 
 150. Press Release, Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., New Report on Acquisitions of Archaeological 
Materials and Ancient Art Issued by Association of Art Museum Directors 1 (June 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.aamd.org/newsroom/documents/2008ReportAndRelease  (“[The report] [r]ecognizes the 
1970 UNESCO Convention as providing the most pertinent threshold date for the application of more 
rigorous standards to the acquisition of archaeological material and ancient art.  Widely accepted 
internationally, the 1970 UNESCO Convention helps create a unified set of expectations for museums, 
sellers, and donors. . . . .  [The report] [s]tates that AAMD members normally should not acquire a work 
unless research substantiates that the work was outside its country of probable modern discovery before 
1970 or was legally exported from its probable country of modern discovery after 1970.  [The report] 
[p]rovides a specific framework for members to evaluate the circumstances under which a work that 
does not have a complete ownership history dating to 1970 may be considered for acquisition.”); see 
also AM. ASS’N OF MUSEUMS, STANDARDS REGARDING ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIALS AND ANCIENT 
ART 1 (2008), available at  http://www.ifar.org/upload/PDFLink49147a7825e13AAM%20-
%20Standards%20Regarding%20Archaeological%20Material%20and%20Ancient%20Art.pdf (“In 
addition, AAMD recommends that museums require documentation that the object was out of its 
probable country of modern discovery by November 17, 1970, the date on which the UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property was signed.”). 
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individual elements of a legal claim can be proved.151 
C.  COOPERATION AGREEMENTS:  RETURNS IN EXCHANGE FOR LOANS 
The most significant impact of the stringent laws, the sustained presence of 
illicit trading and the subsequent scandals is the large number of returns that 
followed source country repatriation claims following investigations by source 
countries.  Between 2005 and 2010, U.S. museums returned 102 objects to Italy 
and Greece.152  Private collectors have also returned a number of objects.153  For 
the most part, the objects returned were high quality and rare works acquired under 
dubious circumstances or with insufficient documentation after 1970.154  
Sometimes the returns were spontaneous, and at other times they were the result of 
lengthy negotiations between museum officials and the authorities of the source 
country claiming the objects.  The course of such negotiations depended on the 
strength of the evidence of theft.155  The outcome of these negotiations was 
recorded in agreements that set out the conditions of the returns.  This section of 
the Article examines the negotiation procedures and the terms regulating the returns 
of artifacts contained in the cooperation agreements entered into by the Getty, the 
Met and the Princeton Museums with the Italian authorities.  Special attention will 
be given to whether such returns were compensated with loans to the returnee, and, 
if so, details about these loans will be discussed, including the duration and the 
importance of the piece on loan.  Overall, these agreements are important on two 
levels.  First, they introduce a new model to resolve restitution disputes outside the 
judicial context based on negotiation and international cooperation, and second 
they show how the concept of long-term loans has worked in this setting. 
 
 151. See Christopher Chippindale & David W.J. Gill, Material Consequences of Contemporary 
Classical Collecting, 104 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 463, 470–71 (2000). 
 152. See FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 307.   
 153. See id.  The authors explain that in addition to returns from museums, returns also came from 
private collections: eight from Jerome Eisenberg, fourteen from Shelby White, and 251 from the 
Aboutaam brothers.  Id. at 307; see also Elisabetta Povoledo, Two Marble Sculptures to Return to Sicily, 
N.Y. TIMES, B7, Sept. 1, 2007 (discussing recent returns to Italy); Conversation with Jeanette 
Papadopoulos, supra note 34 (explaining that, after failed attempts to remain anonymous, in 2002 
millionaire Maurice Tempelsman donated two acroliths to the University of Virginia Art Museum, 
which later returned them to Italy.). 
 154. For specific information on the returned objects, see David Gill, Minerva: Holding Back on 
the Detail?, LOOTING MATTERS (Nov. 10, 2007), http://lootingmatters.blogspot.com/2007/11/minerva-
holding-back-on-detail.html; David Gill, Shelby White, the Returns to Italy, and the Geneva Polaroids, 
LOOTING MATTERS (Jan. 18, 2008), http://lootingmatters.blogspot.com/2008/01/shelby-white-returns-
to-italy-and.html.  
 155. Conversation with Claire Lyons; supra note 125; Conversation with James Steward, supra 
note 125.  Lyons explains that in 1999, Getty spontaneously returned three objects to Italy: 
Euphronious/Onesimos vase shards bought from different dealers over time, a Mithras torso, and a bust 
of Diadumenus.  Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125.  Steward explains that in 2002, the 
Princeton Art Museum voluntarily returned to the Italian government an ancient Roman sculptural relief 
in its collection, having contacted the Italian authorities after the museum’s own research revealed that 
the work was taken out of Italy without a legal export permit before the museum acquired it in good 
faith in 1985.  Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125.  
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1.  The Met’s Cooperation Agreement with Italy 
The 2006 collaborative agreement between the Metropolitan Museum of Art and 
Italy was the first agreement establishing formal cooperation between a U.S. 
institution and the Italian government in the broader context of combating illicit 
trade.  It set the precedent for the agreements that followed.156  The Met agreed to 
repatriate six pieces at different times:  the Euphronios krater in 2008, the set of 
sixteen Morgantina silver vessels in 2010, and four additional items shortly after 
the agreement had been made.157  Title to these objects was transferred 
immediately.  In return, Italy agreed to loan the silver vessels from Morgantina to 
the Met for short-term exhibitions every four years and to provide loans of works 
of art of “equivalent beauty and importance to the [other] objects being 
returned.”158  Former director of the Met Philippe de Montebello referred to this 
cooperation as “a highly equitable arrangement.”159 
The agreement describes in detail the quality of the items that are to arrive on 
loan from Italy to compensate for the return of the Euphronios krater and the length 
of time for which they will be loaned.  For the duration of the agreement, which is 
set at forty years, Italy will make four-year loans of predetermined items on a 
continuing and rotating basis.160  The agreement specifically lists twelve items 
agreed to by the parties to be of “equivalent beauty and importance” to the 
Euphronios krater, objects that include very major pieces from prominent Italian 
archaeological museums.161  In short, at least one of these twelve numbered objects 
will be on view at the Metropolitan instead of the Euphronios krater until the 
agreement expires. 
In the past five years Italy held to the agreement by providing the Met with 
several items on loan: a Laconian drinking cup in 2006; three pieces, including a 
cup signed by the potter Euxitheos and painted by Oltos in 2008; and a terracotta 
kylix and the Moregine treasure in 2010.162  Official statements report that the four 
 
 156.  Aaron K. Briggs, Consequences of the Met-Italy Accord for the International Restitution of 
Cultural Property, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 623, 623 (2007).  See generally Met-Italy Agreement, supra note 
123. 
 157. Statement by the Metropolitan Museum of Art on Its Agreement with Italian Ministry of 
Culture, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-
museum/press-room/news/2006/statement-by-the-metropolitan-museum-of-art-on-its-agreement-with-
italian-ministry-of-culture#.  
 158. Id.; see also Met-Italy Agreement, supra note 123, § 4.1(b) (providing a list of twelve specific 
objects that could be suitable loans). 
 159. Statement by the Metropolitan Museum of Art on Its Agreement with Italian Ministry of 
Culture, supra note 157. 
 160. Met-Italy Agreement, supra note 123, § 4.1(b). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.; Important Antiquities Lent by Republic of Italy on View at Metropolitan Museum, 
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-
museum/press-room/news/2010/important-antiquities-lent-by-republic-of-italy-on-view-at-metropolitan-
museum.  The further two pieces loaned in 2008 include a jug shaped as a young woman’s head and a 
fourth-century B.C. vase of showing Oedipus solving the riddle of the sphinx.  Lee Rosenbaum, 
Euphronios’ Last Day Is Sunday; Italy to Substitute a Jug, Cup and Vase, CULTUREGRRL (Jan. 10, 
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loans of 2006 and 2008 are thought to provide a time-limited replacement for the 
Euphronios krater.163  These statements are significant because they point to the 
fact that once outgoing loans have served as compensation for the returns and Italy 
has met the obligations of the agreement, there may no longer be any incentive for 
Italy to continue loaning objects to the Met. 
2.  The Getty’s Cooperation Agreements with Italy and Greece 
In 2006, to celebrate the opening of the renovated Getty Villa in Malibu, 
California, the Getty had asked Italy permission to borrow bronzes from the 
Archaeological Museum of Naples as part of a special exhibition.164  The request 
was denied based on the lack of transparency of the Getty’s acquisition practices 
and the presence of disputed objects in its collection; in fact, Marion True was 
being tried in Rome at the time.165  According to the Italian deputy attorney 
general, who was directly involved in the negotiations in connection with 
restitution and exchanges with the Getty, the Italians took into consideration the 
Getty’s lack of commitment to responsible acquisition standards and its 
presumptuous behavior.166 
Between 2006 and 2007, Italy formally claimed forty-two objects from the 
Getty’s collection.  Negotiations resulted in the Getty agreeing to transfer forty 
objects to Italy on which the Getty is said to have spent more than $44 million.167  
The list of items returned included the Cult Statue of a Goddess, also known as the 
Aphrodite, which would remain on display at the Getty Villa until 2010, in addition 
to several items that came from the Fleishman Collection, a very important and 
equally controversial collection that the Getty had partially acquired and partially 
received as a donation in 1996.168  By 2007 no consensus as to a formal agreement 
could be found because of an ongoing and still unresolved dispute involving a 
bronze.169  However, according to a 2009 joint statement from Italy and the Getty, 
 
2008), http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2008/01/euphronios_last_day_is_sunday.html. 
 163. Three Spectacular Vases Lent by Italy to Metropolitan Museum for Four Years Replace 
Euphronios Krater, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.metmuseum.org/ 
about-the-museum/press-room/news/2008/three-spectacular-vases-lent-by-italy-to-metropolitan-
museum-for-four-years-replace-euphronios-krater (“These loans come to the Met in exchange for the 
return of the Euphronios krater to Italy.”); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 162.  
 164. Hugh Eakin, Italy Goes on the Offensive with Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at E1.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, supra note 116. 
 167. See FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 198, 304; see also Gill & Chippindale, From 
Malibu to Rome, supra note 3, at 206 (confirming that most of the tainted objects that had to be returned 
were acquired by Getty curator Marion True during the 1980s.). 
 168. See FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 124.  Felch and Frammolino explain that in 1994 
the Getty agreed to buy thirty-three objects from the Fleischmans for $20 million.  Id. at 144.  The next 
year, the Fleischmans donated their collection, amounting to 288 objects, to the Getty; this donation was 
very controversial because 90% of the pieces have no ascertained provenance and around the same 
percentage surfaced after 1970.  Id. 
 169. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125.  She explains that this lack of consensus is 
because of the ongoing discussion relating to the Statue of a Victorious Youth and the outcome of 
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the two parties “agreed to broad cultural collaboration that will include loans of 
significant art works, joint exhibitions, research, and conservation projects.”170  In 
the same year the Getty received two important pieces on loan from the Museo 
Archeologico di Napoli and one from the Museo Archeologico di Firenze.171  
Although the objects from Naples were being loaned to the Getty for an initial 
period of two years (i.e., from 2009 to 2011), one of the loans, the Ephebe as a 
Lampbearer, has been renewed for another two years, thereby allowing the Getty to 
keep it until 2013.172 
In 2010, an agreement formalized the cultural collaboration that had already 
started between the two parties and provided the Getty with further loans from 
Italy.173  One of them, the Chimaera of Arezzo, had never left Italy before.174  The 
senior antiquities curator at the Getty explains that conservation institute at the 
Getty provided conservation services to some of the objects on loan:  a new seismic 
isolation base was created for the Agrigento Youth statue, and a new display vitrine 
was produced for the Gela Krater.175  In early 2012, several objects from the 
archaeological site of Morgantina in central Sicily arrived at the Getty Museum in 
view of their future display at the exhibition entitled, “Sicily:  Art and Innovation 
Between Greece and Rome.”176  Through this cooperation agreement, which is to 
last twenty-five years, the Getty has been able to build solid relationships not only 
with the ministry in Rome, but with individual archaeological museums as well as 
Italy’s sovraintendenze, the specific regional boards that yield vast power over 
Italian culture.177 
Between 2006 and 2007, four antiquities, including a Thasian relief, a Boeotian 
stele, a funerary wreath and the statue of a woman known as a kore, were returned 
to Greece following an official claim.178  In 2011, following the restitution of 
further two objects acquired in the 1970s (fragments of a grave marker and a Greek 
language inscription), an agreement setting out a framework of Cultural 
Cooperation was signed by the J. Paul Getty Museum and the Ministry of Culture 
of the Hellenic Republic.179  Commenting on the restitution of the two fragments of 
 
ongoing legal proceedings, which are still underway in Pesaro, Italy.  Id.  
 170. Press Release, supra 123. 
 171. See Press Release, The Getty Trust, Extraordinary Bronze Statue Excavated from Pompeii 
Goes on View at the Getty Villa (May 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.getty.edu/news/press/center/naples_bronze.html. 
 172. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, supra note 116. 
 175. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125. 
 176. Id.; see also Future Exhibitions and Installations, GETTY, http://www.getty.edu/ 
visit/exhibitions/future.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2012).  
 177. Conversation with Jeanette Papadopoulos, supra note 34. 
 178. See Press Release, The Getty Trust, Ministry of Culture for the Hellenic Republic and J. Paul 
Getty Museum Sign Agreement Finalizing Return of Objects to Greece (Feb. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.getty.edu/news/press/center/getty_greece_wreath_kore_release020707.html. 
 179. See David Bomford, A Landmark Antiquities Agreement with Greece, GETTY IRIS (Sept. 22, 
2011), http://blogs.getty.edu/iris/a-landmark-antiquities-agreement-with-greece/. 
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a grave marker, the senior antiquities curator of the Getty explains that “it was 
more a gesture of cooperation because the fragments fit with other fragments in the 
museum in Greece; it was the logical gesture, the right thing to do.”180  Greece 
agreed to loan objects to the Getty; 190 loans from numerous Greek institutions 
have now been confirmed in view of the upcoming exhibition entitled “Heaven and 
Earth:  Art of Byzantium from Greek Collections,” which will take place in 
2014.181 
3.  Princeton’s Cooperation Agreement with Italy 
In 2007 Princeton University agreed to return eight out of fifteen disputed 
antiquities to the Italian government.182  The agreement completed negotiations that 
began in April 2006; Princeton would immediately transfer ownership of the eight 
objects to Italy, although it would hold onto four of them as loans for an additional 
four years.183  An addendum to the agreement was signed in June 2011, according 
to which the University transferred title to eight further works of art to Italy.184  As 
part of the agreement, Italy agreed to lend Princeton an unspecified number of 
works of art of “great significance and cultural importance,” and to give Princeton 
faculty and students “unprecedented access” to Italian archaeological sites and 
materials.185  This last point is significant because it is consistent with the 
commitment of a cultural institution, which is part of a leadership research 
university, to prioritize the advancement of archaeological scholarship.186  The 
schooling and research element that access to Italian archaeological sites may give 
is crucial to the educational mission of Princeton University because it gives art 
history and archaeology scholars new research material to advance their work and 
careers. 
In addition to the four objects that will stay at the Princeton Museum, since 2007 
two additional objects were loaned from Italy for an initial four-year term. These 
objects, a bronze vessel of a hydra and a marble head, are classified by the director 
of the Princeton Museum as “anchor objects, of such quality that they have the 
capability of having the deepest teaching impact.”187  He further explains that such 
impact comes in two ways:  through course-related work at the university’s art and 
archaeology departments and through the mission of public engagement with the 
 
 180. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125. 
 181. Id.; see also Future Exhibitions and Installations, supra note 176. 
 182. Cass Cliatt, University Art Museum, Italy Sign Antiquities Agreement, PRINCETON WKLY. 
BULL., Nov. 12, 2007, at 3, available at http://www.princeton.edu/pr/pwb/07/1112/art/. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Princeton University Art Museum, Italy Reach New Antiquities Agreement, PRINCETON U. 
(Jan. 25, 2012) http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S32/75/13K74/.  
 185. Id. 
 186. See Elisabetta Povoledo, Princeton to Return Disputed Art to Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 
2007, at B7 (“What’s unique about this agreement is that it is calibrated to favor cultural exchanges,” 
Mr. Fiorilli said.  “It’s the right accord for a university.  We hope both sides will profit from it.”). 
 187. Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125. 
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local community, including the museum’s docent program.188 
4.  The Significance of Cooperation Agreements 
These agreements represent “a new deal” in this context because they delineate a 
cultural project based on reciprocity that is much broader than mere restitution.189  
These cooperation agreements are contracts between states and foreign nationals, 
which are different from responsibilities under an international treaty such as the 
1970 UNESCO Convention.  It was crucial for Italy that U.S. museums would take 
responsibility for their actions in a direct way by agreeing to resolve future 
controversies through a collaboration that stems from a commitment to the cause of 
combating illicit trade.190  By becoming party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 
the U.S. Department of State made the same commitment, but signing the 
cooperation agreements bound individual private institutions to specific duties. 
Overall, these accords show how negotiation presented several advantages over 
other judicial remedies because they enabled the parties to fully evaluate and agree 
on specific sets of facts and priorities.  Altogether the above brief analyses have 
shown that the provision of loans in exchange for the restitution of artifacts has 
proved to be a successful strategy that has enabled museums to continue exhibiting 
high quality items.  All agreements discussed above waive the possibility of 
litigation for any of the objects at issue.  Several other U.S. institutions, including 
the MFA in Boston and the Cleveland Museum of Art, have also negotiated 
cooperation agreements that included the provision of long-term loans when 
required to return artifacts to Italy.191  The deputy attorney general for Italy 
confirms that other museums have recently gotten in touch with him to establish 
connections and start negotiations.192  The willingness to negotiate and find 
mutually convenient terms is the result of Italy’s use of loans to leverage the 
restitution of objects, and of U.S. museums’ dependence on access to Italian 
cultural property to run some of their programs.193  Although most of these 
agreements are drafted broadly, thus implying that the cooperation may last for 
longer periods of time,194 it is unclear whether source countries will continue 
lending their masterpieces to U.S. institutions once the loans given in exchange for 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Met-Italy Agreement, supra note 123, pmbl. §§ G, H.  The museum “deplores the illicit 
and unscientific excavation of archaeological materials” and “is committed to the responsible acquisition 
of archaeological materials and ancient art according to the principle that all collecting be done with the 
highest criteria of ethical and professional practice.”  Id. 
 190. Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, supra note 116; Conversation with Jeanette 
Papadopoulos, supra note 34. 
 191. Press Release, Museum of Fine Arts, Bos., and Italian Ministry of Culture, Museum of Fine 
Arts, Boston and Italian Ministry of Culture Sign Agreement Marking New Era of Cultural Exchange 
(Sept. 28, 2006) available at http://www.mfa.org/collections/art-past/italian-ministry-culture-agreement. 
 192. Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, supra note 116. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (confirming that the approximate duration of these agreements is between twenty and forty 
years). 
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the returned items have expired.  One could hope the warm relationship continues, 
but it might not. 
III.  LEASING ANTIQUITIES 
The main issue seems to be that antiquities departments of U.S. museums are 
severely restricted in their acquisition strategies because the licit market in 
antiquities is narrow, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to acquire 
legitimately provenanced objects on the art market.  These departments have come 
to rely on cooperation agreements with source countries for the provision of new 
high quality pieces to exhibit.  Loans through these recently negotiated partnerships 
have proved very successful and have made it possible for U.S. institutions to 
associate their public images with unique objects.  However, as the above analysis 
has shown, these loans were made in view of the return of artifacts, and it is unclear 
whether Italy and other source countries will continue lending their masterpieces to 
U.S. institutions once loans for the returned items have expired.  Notwithstanding 
their success, it is probably not realistic to assume that a structure based on loans 
through partnerships can satisfactorily supplement the licit trade in antiquities, 
especially considering that there is also a constant high demand coming from 
private collectors and other institutions that have not negotiated cooperation 
agreements.195 
The demand for antiquities in the U.S. market is much broader than the demand 
met by such agreements, and to be satisfied it would require a substantial flow of 
transactions.196  Furthering the lending strategies that began with cooperation 
agreements and turning them into leases could provide a sound addition to the 
traditional collecting routes.  The development of a rental market through leases 
has the potential to overcome some of the limits of the international trade in 
cultural property described above:  ownership issues are not resolved by passing 
proprietary rights for an indefinite period of time, thereby enabling the country of 
origin to maintain final patrimony rights and ultimate jurisdiction over the object.  
In addition, given that a lease differs from a sales contract in that it offers only a 
temporary possessory interest, most legal restrictions contained in patrimony laws 
would not be applicable.197  Overall, the development of robust leasing 
mechanisms would undercut sales on the black market by replacing acquisitions:  
the longer duration of such leases would reduce shipping and insurance costs, and it 
would make the lease more similar to an acquisition and therefore more attractive 
 
 195. Maria Baugh, Antiquities: The Hottest Investment, TIME MAG., Dec. 12, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1693792,00.html; see also Stephen 
Wilmot, Antiquities: The War of Art, FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/ 
s/0/be1859ba-9caf-11e0-bf57-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JRHPFX9Y. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Both the relevant Italian and Greek laws apply to sales contracts.  See Legge 1 giugno 1939, 
n. 1089 (It.), amended by Legge 1 marzo 1975, n. 44 (It.), Legge 30 marzo 1998, n. 88 (It.), and Legge 
30 marzo 1998, n. 100 (It.); Nomos (1932:5351) O nomos Arxaiotitwn [The Antiquities Act], 1932 
(Greece). 
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to a potential lessee. 
A.  FROM LENDING TO LEASING ANTIQUITIES 
Once the loans made by Italy have fulfilled the obligations of the repatriation 
agreements, other incentives will need to be found in order to maintain cooperation.  
Partnerships could be extended to continue providing U.S. museums with new 
pieces to exhibit by regulating loans not as compensation for returned items, but as 
transactions that would involve either the payment of a fee, exchanges for other 
artifacts, scholarly and conservation work or anything else the parties are willing to 
negotiate.  This seems to be a fair approach that would allow different institutions 
to seek out loans in return for a variety of options that would provide direct cash 
incentives or would indirectly increase the value of the artifact.198  Museums with 
outstanding collections can propose exchanges of objects, institutions with 
conservation institutes can offer conservation work, those with research centers can 
provide scholarly publications, and museums with large endowments can pay a fee.  
Combinations should be possible too, as long as there is a counterpart in the 
collection of the museum seeking the exchange. 
All of this has, in part, been happening already.  The Getty’s senior curator of 
antiquities confirmed that most loans into which the Getty has entered a result of 
the cooperation agreement with Italy were part of broader scientific projects to 
study these objects, publish scholarly work about them, and learn from them 
through conservation work.199  The production of a seismic base for the Agrigento 
Youth statue mentioned above confirms this and further implies that having one of 
the top conservation institutes in the world gives the Getty substantial leverage 
when negotiating a loan.200  Museum officers seem to agree that although loans can 
be costly—mainly because of the transaction costs of drafting the loan contract, but 
also because of transport and insurance costs—they are also immensely profitable 
in ways not immediately quantifiable in monetary terms.201  A balance has to be 
struck when an institution decides whether incurring these costs will have positive 
 
 198. See Neil Brodie, Academic Facilitation of the Antiquities Market, in INTERNATIONAL 
MEETING ON ILLICIT TRAFFIC OF CULTURAL PROPERTY, supra note 112, at 103, 104 (arguing that 
scholarly work and publication increases the value of an object by a considerable amount). 
 199. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125. 
 200. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 175 (discussing the Getty’s production of a 
seismic base for the Agrigento Youth statue).  
 201. See Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125.  Steward explained that loaning fees 
for items are often nominal ($500 to $1000) and offset by the costs involved, which involve larger sums 
of money to cover insurance, administrative expenses, transport and packaging of the object.  Id.  
Steward notes the expense of $10,000 for the special shipping crate for a particularly precious and 
fragile vase.  Id.; see also the Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Act, Pub. L. No. 94-158, 89 Stat. 844 (1975) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 971–977) (providing for reduced insurance costs for American 
museums borrowing objects from abroad as part of traveling exhibitions).  The Arts and Artifacts 
Indemnity Act was amended in 2007 to establish a parallel domestic indemnity program with up to $5 
billion coverage for domestic exhibitions taking place at one time.  Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 426(2), 121 
Stat. 1844, 2151 (2007) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 974(b)). 
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externalities.  The externalities in question are mainly connected with exposure, 
which will be addressed below in Part III.B. 
When asked about the incentive for source countries to continue lending once 
the returns have been “covered,” the director of the Princeton Museum takes the 
position that source countries have a critical interest in establishing and maintaining 
good relationships with important U.S. institutions, because this cooperation can be 
extended to other art-related fields and because the work such loans foster 
“increases the historical value of such objects through research and public 
exposure, advancing knowledge of individual cultures and our shared cultural 
heritage through the appreciation of great works of art.”202  This is certainly true, 
but there is no doubt that U.S. museum directors are conscious of the fact that they 
too need to foster good relations with Italy in order to access ancient material.  The 
director of the Princeton Museum adds that at present, out of fear of drawing 
attention to particular at-risk objects and thereby exposing themselves to claims for 
repatriation, some museums have become loathe to display or publish insufficiently 
documented objects; as a consequence, there have been fewer publications 
recently.203  This is one of a number of what can be termed unintended 
consequences of vigorous repatriation efforts.  The effect of driving numerous 
objects already held in public collections “underground” is clearly against the 
interest of everyone—museums, scholars and the general public—and it reminds us 
that the intention of stricter policies is supposed to cut down on illicit trade, not on 
research, publication and public access.  The public good is reflected in the notions 
of access, distribution and impact through scholarship and education.  American 
museums are champions of keeping up these values through the quality of their 
exhibitions and publications and through the extent of their outreach to the public 
through educational programs.204  The problems posed by the acquisition of 
cultural objects may be overcome with loans, as the standard is looser than that of 
acquisition policies, but there still is a need for transparency.  That is part of the 
reason why the Princeton Museum is in the process of coming up with a policy on 
loans that requires disclosure of all known provenance and compliance with 
prevailing laws, bilateral agreements and provenance indications.205 
What is in store for source countries like Italy in the future, once loans provided 
for by cooperation agreements have been granted and the demands of gratitude for 
restitution have been met?206  Conservation work and fostering strong relationships 
 
 202. Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125. 
 203. Id. 
 204. John Henry Merryman, Museum Ethics, 1 ART & MUSEUM L.J. 93 (2006), reprinted in JOHN 
HENRY MERRYMAN, THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL 
PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 568 (2d ed. 2009). 
 205. Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125.  Princeton’s loan policy is stricter than the 
AAMD loan policy in that the AAMD policy does not require compliance with the laws of the country 
of origin. The AAMD policy guidelines also state that “[l]ong-term loans . . . should be evaluated under 
criteria comparable to those for acquisitions”; codes on acquisitions are stricter than codes regulating 
loans.  Press Release, Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., supra note 140. 
 206. See generally Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Makes Its Choices of Antiquities to Lend Met, N.Y. 
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with prestigious institutions are certainly important factors, but they are hard to 
quantify in monetary terms since they are fundamentally barter transactions.  The 
problem with loans when understood as barter transactions—transactions in which 
objects are exchanged for either other objects or relevant services—is that such 
transactions require a coincidence of wants.  The exchange costs involved in a 
barter transaction are high:  negotiations between the parties to determine whether 
the transaction is in their favor can be lengthy and do not always result in a 
successful the transfer.  Adam Smith recognized the limitations of barter 
transactions long ago:  “[I]n order to avoid the inconveniency of such situations, 
every prudent man . . . must have at all times by him a certain quantity of some one 
commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in 
exchange for the produce of their industry.”207  From here stems the need to find a 
medium of exchange that can be used for any good or service and create a general 
purchasing power. 
If the quantity of loans must expand to cover the high demand for antiquities in 
the U.S. market, it is necessary to have a readily verifiable measure of 
compensation for such instruments, such as a lending fee.  The payment of a fee 
would transform an uncompensated loan into a lease.  Since the development of an 
efficient leasing market depends on systematic mechanisms of value assignment 
and price formulation, the introduction of fees would regulate lending instruments 
and give them a more uniform structure.  This would lower transaction and 
coordination costs and enable such arrangements to occur on a broader scale.  The 
same contractual terms as in loan contracts could be kept with regards to insurance, 
duty of care, maintenance, governing laws, etc., and a clause relating to the fee 
payment would be included.  Such fee would be based on the leasing term and the 
significance of the object; moreover, the price would indirectly reflect when the 
prestige of showing a new artifact for an extended period of time provides an 
adequate substitute for full ownership.  Museums would pay money for the 
temporary possession of objects instead of buying only when they see a benefit 
accruing that cannot otherwise be obtained.  Activity on a leasing market will help 
to establish prices that respond to the interaction of supply and demand and give 
leasing options a more consistent structure that would make them easier to trade.  If 
the costs of negotiating a lease are still higher than reducing the transaction costs 
involved, then barter will occur instead. 
A substantial expansion of the licit trade in cultural objects could be 
accomplished if source countries and market countries become active participants 
in a leasing market.  The implementation of a leasing model could become a viable 
way to continue collecting once cooperation agreements have expired.  Recent 
successful examples of the international leasing of works of art include the Louvre 
agreeing to lease between two and three hundred artworks to its counterpart in Abu 
 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at E2 (“Maurizio Fiorilli, a lawyer for the Italian state, said that Italy’s offer of 
the funerary sets was a show of ‘good will’ toward foreign institutions that agree to return illegally 
excavated booty.  ‘It’s a generous offer,’ he said.”). 
 207. 1 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 20 (J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1964) (1910). 
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Dhabi over a ten-year period for a total sum of $247 million.208  Another example 
is the King Tut exhibit, which was leased to a private agency on behalf of the 
Egyptian government and circulated in London and the United States between 2005 
and 2008 for a fee of $5 million per city.209  This trend of monetizing collections 
could also be adopted for classical antiquities.  For instance, when the Art Institute 
of Chicago opened new galleries of Greek, Roman and Byzantine art in November 
2012, it paid a lender’s fee for borrowing fifty-one objects from an international 
institution.210 For the moment, discrete negotiations continue, and it is possible 
Italy may want to see tangible returns on the loans it grants in the future. 
B.  THE QUALITY ARGUMENT: INCREASING GOODWILL 
Knowledge about the preferences of the demand is a crucial feature if a leasing 
market is to replace some of the outright acquisitions.  In the past decades the 
curators of the selected museums have focused on the acquisition of prominent 
pieces as their purchase and exhibition brought prestige and recognition to their 
respective institutions.211  Given that this Article focuses on museums with 
established collections and that recent trends have shown that decisions on 
acquisitions favor fewer high quality objects as opposed to larger numbers of lesser 
pieces, the argument will concentrate on how leasing high quality objects can 
enhance museum collections, exhibitions and displays. 
There is a special prestige that can arguably only be conferred by the ownership 
of a masterpiece.  Besides the aesthetical value, not only its rarity and uniqueness 
draws visitors and experts to view a masterpiece at its hosting institution, but also 
the educational and scholarly works of researchers and curators both help to create 
an association between the museum and the piece.  By inspiring exhibitions, 
publications and conferences, such high quality pieces have the power to increase 
goodwill toward their holding institutions—a rise in reputation may result from the 
possession of certain objects—and the added prestige may be such that these 
objects become trademarks of a collection or a museum in general.  The Getty’s 
Cult Statue of a Goddess (also known as Aphrodite) is one of the best examples 
because it illustrates the willingness of an institution to invest a large sum of money 
 
 208. Alan Riding, The Louvre’s Art: Priceless.  The Louvre’s Name: Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
7, 2007, at E5 (“France is profiting handsomely from this deal: in exchange for $247 million, it will 
rotate between 200 and 300 artworks through the Louvre Abu Dhabi during a 10-year period.”).  See 
generally Le Project Scientifique et Culturel, AGENCE FRANCE-MUSÉUMS, http:// 
www.agencefrancemuseums.fr/fr/le-louvre-abou-dabi/le-projet-scientifique-et-culturel/ (last visited Jan. 
8, 2013) (discussing the Louvre Abu Dhabi’s scientific and cultural project).  
 209. Talk of the Nation, New Blockbusters: Traveling Exhibits (NPR radio broadcast Jun. 1, 2005) 
(transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=4675421); see 
also Laura Porter, King Tut Exhibition Returns to London, ABOUT.COM LONDON TRAVEL (Mar. 14, 
2007), http://golondon.about.com/b/2007/03/14/king-tut-exhibition-returns-to-london.htm. 
 210. E-mail from Karen Manchester, Chair & Curator of Ancient Art, Dep’t of Ancient & 
Byzantine Art, Art Inst. of Chi., to author (Feb. 11, 2013) (on file with author). 
 211. Conversation with Sharon Cott, supra note 125; Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 
125; Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125.  
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for a trademark piece.  The Getty paid $18 million, the highest sum ever paid by an 
antiquities department for a single work, to acquire this exclusive object even 
though there was a strong suspicion that the object had been recently looted.212  
Similarly, the Sabina at the MFA and the Met’s Euphronios krater are both iconic 
symbols that conform to the high quality masterpiece analysis above and were 
bought under suspicious circumstances for large sums of money.  Both were later 
returned to Italy.213 
Recent acquisitions as well as the loans made by Italy involve prestigious items, 
the possession of which has the potential to improve reputation.  The deputy 
attorney general for Italy confirms that “museums ask for the best pieces on view, 
they don’t really care about the items in storage.”214  This is not necessarily true 
according to other commentators, who think that the material in storage in source 
countries can include very valuable pieces for which there is a strong demand, 
especially if acquired in exchange for conservation work.215  Ultimately, it depends 
on a combination of aesthetic values, the solidity of the cultural content that the 
object carries with it, and the context the work would find in a borrowing or leasing 
institution.  Leasing items from storage would have many advantages; for instance, 
it would not frustrate the expectations of visitors who expect to view specific pieces 
in their home institutions, which might otherwise discourage art-related tourism in 
the long-run due to the fact that visitors may incur the risk of not finding a 
particular known object on display in its expected location.  In addition, such loans 
might relieve storage burdens on the lending museums, as well as benefit the public 
good, by providing access to works of art that might otherwise languish in 
repositories. 
The senior antiquities curator at the Getty asserts that, presently, decisions to 
collect are based on a number of observations, including the quality features of an 
item, its fit within the context of the collection, and the impact it can have on the 
public, experts as well as visitors.216  The Princeton Museum director agrees in 
part, noting that quality comes before all other considerations because generally 
high quality pieces will fit into every well-established museum collection, and such 
works are therefore in greatest demand.217  The curator for Greek and Roman art at 
the Carlos Museum, located at Emory University, makes decisions based on “filling 
gaps” and would therefore borrow or acquire objects for which there is no 
comparable work in the collection already.218  Either way, the problem is that there 
are not enough high quality objects with cleared provenance on the market, and 
museums with similarly strict acquisition policies are likely to find themselves in 
 
 212. See generally FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1(narrating the exact story of the 
negotiations and how some Getty officials acted in order to retain the object). 
 213. Id. at 307. 
 214. Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, supra note 116. 
 215. Telephone Conversation with Jasper Gaunt, Curator of Greek and Roman Art, Carlos 
Museum, Emory Univ. (May 2, 2012). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125. 
 218. Telephone Conversation with Jasper Gaunt, supra note 215. 
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competition for the same works.219  Before source nations claimed works, the 
demand of museums centered on beautiful, glamorous and aesthetically pleasing 
objects, regardless of provenance issues.  Nowadays, provenance carries real value.  
Reviews of recent auction catalogues confirm that a sound provenance can drive up 
prices considerably and is becoming an increasingly important parameter when 
deciding on acquisitions.220 
The fact that repatriations have often involved very important objects is a strong 
indicator that high quality objects with a clear provenance are difficult to acquire 
on the licit market.221  Objects that have surfaced recently with an obscure 
provenance are most likely the product of illicit excavations; otherwise, they would 
have been published and their existence and whereabouts would be known to 
experts in the field.  In contrast, previously discovered masterpieces are known to 
be in specific locations, and their owners have tended to keep them due to the 
scarcity of supply that would make it difficult to acquire substitutes.  Furthermore, 
when important pieces with legitimate provenance are sold, the seller usually has a 
strong interest in publicizing the fact in order to attract the highest bidder.  Indeed, 
significant competition from museum bidders seeking such objects has grown in 
recent years.  If curators are after objects for which there is very little supply on the 
international market, the adoption of leases should become the rational choice for 
furthering collections because such temporary measures would not trigger the 
application of import restrictions and would make the circulation of artifacts easier.  
The situation is complicated by the retentionist efforts of most patrimony laws, 
which specifically identify high quality objects and prohibit their trade.222 
C.  ITALIAN AND GREEK LAWS REGULATING LOANS 
Considering that loans have been successful in the past, and that the demand for 
high quality pieces remains high, the next issue becomes whether international 
treaties and the laws regulating loans in source countries are structured in a way 
 
 219. Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125. 
 220. Silvia Beltrametti, Proposed Title: The Impact of Recent Legal Developments on the Sale 
Prices of Antiquities Sold at Auction (research project in progress) (on file with author).  Through this 
research, I analyze empirically the impact of the prosecutions of Schultz and Marion True on the way 
ancient art is sold.  I am looking in particular at which factors drive the prices of antiquities and have 
assembled a database of approximately 17,500 classical and Egyptian antiquities sold by Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s in the past seventeen years.  I am using this data to show that the value of provenance has 
risen.  A strong provenance can drive prices up considerably in comparison to the base estimate that the 
auction house sets before the sale. 
 221. See Efrat, supra note 7, at 85 (“[A]cquisition today carries significant risks for museums, 
especially the risks of legal battles, either over civil claims for return or over criminal charges.  
Museums caught in unlawful possession of antiquities pay a hefty price in terms of reputation and public 
trust as well as loss of the acquisition funds.  The chilling effect of litigation has increased the reliance 
on loans and has made museums more cautious about accepting antiquities from collectors.”); see also 
Derek Fincham, Why U.S. Federal Criminal Penalties for Dealing in Illicit Cultural Property are 
Ineffective, and a Pragmatic Alternative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 597, 598 (2007). 
 222. See, e.g., Legge 1 giugno 1939, n. 1089 arts. 30–41 (It.). 
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that would make leasing to foreign institutions possible.  When inspecting national 
laws, the length of time that an object can be kept abroad becomes crucial:  the 
longer the term of the lease, the more similar it becomes to an acquisition, and, its 
likelihood of serving as a trademark piece increases.  A longer leasing term and a 
strong association value will make a lease relatively more valuable to the lessee. 
Although, the export controls supported by the 1970 UNESCO Convention lead 
to the over-retention of cultural material by source countries, as described in Part I, 
the Convention’s preamble states:  “[T]he interchange of cultural property among 
nations for scientific, cultural and educational purposes increases the knowledge of 
the civilization of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual 
respect and appreciation among nations.”223  The concept of exchange is elaborated 
upon in a subsequent UNESCO Recommendation, which promotes international 
exchanges understood as “transfers of ownership, use or custody of cultural 
property between States or cultural institutions in different countries—whether it 
takes the form of the loan, deposit, sale or donation of such property—carried out 
under such conditions as may be agreed between the parties concerned.”224  This is 
a clear encouragement to find procedures that allow for the circulation of artifacts.  
The preamble of the Recommendation also includes a specific reference to the fact 
that there is a marketable surplus of objects in source countries that would be 
welcomed by institutions in other countries.225 
The bilateral agreement into which Italy and the United States entered after the 
enactment of the CPIA incarnates, to a certain extent, a spirit of reciprocity and 
cooperation involving exchanges:  it grants restrictions on imports of Italian 
artifacts into the United States but also includes a provision referring to long-term 
loans of archaeological material.226  Article II.E of the agreement states that Italy 
will use its best efforts to promote each long-term loan of objects for research and 
education for as long as necessary.227  A success story illustrating the effect of such 
a provision involves a five-year traveling exhibition starting in 2004 of the 
 
 223. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 224. General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
Nairobi, Kenya, Oct. 26, 1976–Nov. 30, 1976, Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange 
of Cultural Property, Records (Vol. I), Annex I 16, 17 (Nov. 26, 1976), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114038E.pdf. 
 225. See id. at 16 (“[M]any cultural institutions, whatever their financial resources, possess several 
identical or similar specimens of cultural objects of indisputable quality and origin which are amply 
documented, and . . . some of these items, which are of only minor or secondary importance for these 
institutions because of their plurality, would be welcomed as valuable accessions by institutions in other 
countries . . . .”).   
 226. 2001 U.S.-Italy Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 93. 
 227. CULTURAL PROP. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUIDELINES: LOANS OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL 
MATERIAL UNDER THE 2001 U.S.-ITALY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 2 (2001) (“[L]onger term 
loans may be permitted when there is a significant research or education component in the exhibit 
program . . . .”).  A list of examples follows, covering longer loans when substantial conservation could 
be carried out in the United States, scholarly publications may result from the cooperation and 
comparisons with objects in U.S. museums can advance knowledge on the larger historic context or 
other connections between the objects.  Id. 
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Stabiano frescoes, which were previously kept in storage, to nine museums in the 
United States.228  In 2001, the year in which the bilateral agreement was signed, 
Italian cultural heritage laws only permitted exports for displays for one year.  
Longer terms were granted only if significant research and educational components 
were at stake.229  Although “Italy has always been accused of having an excessively 
rigid legislation concerning loans,” notes the deputy attorney general for Italy, “in 
2004, with the introduction of the Italian Cultural Heritage Code, the term was 
extended to four years, and since 2011 renewals are possible.”230 
The key provision of the 2004 Italian code with regards to the temporary exit of 
cultural artifacts is article 67, which permits the provisional circulation of objects if 
such circulation is in pursuit of cultural cooperation agreements with foreign 
institutions.231  Before exiting the country, a certificate must be obtained from the 
relevant export office, which, inter alia, indicates the value of the object and the 
party responsible for its safekeeping when abroad.232  Although article 67 sets four 
years as the maximum circulation duration, the possibility of renewing the 
temporary export license for a further term was introduced in 2011.233  The deputy 
attorney general for Italy argues that “loans can be renewed for a further term if 
convincing arguments concerning the advancement of research or conservation are 
made.”234  He further explains that whereas the notion of high quality conservation 
work is in many ways self-explanatory, for it involves the enhancement of the 
objects and their value, the significance of a research element, when it comes to 
renewing a loan, is mainly related to the study of an art object in a new cultural 
context.235  Extensions will be granted if the object in question can be studied as 
part of a set of objects that enable visitors and scholars to have access to what he 
defines as “a path of cultural testimony.”236  Although conservation initiatives and 
solid research proposals carry substantial weight, the decision seems to rest on 
whether a scientific reinterpretation of the object in question will take place 
 
 228. Telephone Conversation with Jasper Gaunt, supra note 215; see also Letter from Patty 
Gerstenblith, supra note 46 (listing other loans given out to US museums through the bilateral 
agreement); In Stabiano 2005–2008 U.S. Tour Current Schedule, available at 
http://www.niaf.org/events/images/RAS_Events.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (naming the following 
nine U.S. institutions: (1) National Museum of Natural History Washington, DC; (2) Arkansas Arts 
Center, Little Rock, AR; (3) Nevada Museum of Art, Reno, NV; (4) San Diego Museum of Art, San 
Diego, CA; (5) Michael C. Carlos Museum of Art,  Emory University, Atlanta, GA; (6) Toledo Museum 
of Art, Toledo, OH; (7) Elvehjem Museum of Art, University of Wisconsin Madison, WI; (8) Dallas 
Museum of Art, Dallas, TX; and (9) The Cummer Museum of Art and Gardens, Jacksonville, FL).  
 229. Telephone Conversation with Jasper Gaunt, supra note 215. 
 230. Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, supra note 116. 
 231. Decreto Legislativo 22 gennaio 2004, n. 42 (It.). 
 232. Id. at arts. 42, 71 (regulating the powers of the Italian competent authorities, the 
Sovraintendenze). 
 233. Legge 12 luglio 2011, n. 206 arts. 1, 16(bis) (It.) (modifying Decreto Legge 22 gennaio 2004, 
no. 42 art. 67 (It.)). 
 234. Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, supra note 116. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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engaging unexplored contexts.237 
An inspection of loans provided by Italy in pursuit of the cooperation 
agreements with several U.S. museums shows that the negotiation of renewals has 
been successful in a number of cases.238  This demonstrates that decisions will be 
weighed on a case-by-case basis according to the above criteria, with a strong focus 
on the creation of novel contextual relationships, and that loans will be extended 
after a careful balancing of interests.  Depending on the object and on the 
institution welcoming it, a four-year loan may be an adequate timeframe to advance 
the exhibiting purposes of the museum and of scholarship, but not necessarily 
enough time to establish that association between the object and the institution that 
delivers goodwill and prestige.  The occurrence of renewals shows that longer term 
loans are an option if the situation requires it, which enables all parties to the 
decision to adjust their interests.239 
The 2004 Italian code is silent on the possibility of requesting monetary 
compensation for a loan, which makes it an option in theory.  In practice, a new law 
amending the existing code by introducing provisions related to monetary 
compensation would make leasing an established option.  Considering that the 
Italian code was changed frequently since it was introduced in 2004,240 and that 
several of its provisions, such as the duration of the export licenses, have been 
applied with flexibility, further changes that would enable a leasing model (as 
described above) could be an option for the future.  The deputy attorney general for 
Italy claims to favor the idea:  “Pushing in that direction would create resources to 
de-store, valorize and study more items.”241 
The Greek cultural heritage code of 2002 provides that the loans of state-owned 
antiquities to museums or cultural institutions for display as well as educational 
purposes must “take place on condition of reciprocity” and that the item in question 
cannot be of particular significance to the cultural heritage of Greece.242  The 
maximum negotiable term is five years, though it may be renewed.243  Whereas the 
emphasis on a relationship of reciprocity is understandable, the particular 
significance argument is more obscure.  Article 25(2) of the code states that 
particular significance in this context means that the object is not needed to 
complete an existing local collection and that the unity of important objects 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125; see also Hugh Eakin, Italy Goes on the 
Offensive with Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at E1. 
 239. See Cultural Policy Research Inst., supra note 54, at 38 (“We see within Italy the willingness 
to change their laws to allow for the display of objects in the United States that were being borrowed 
from Italy for 6 months.  Now it’s up to 4 years, and I think if the process continues, it will continue to 
be even longer than that.  So I think we see that, in fact, these countries are willing to allow this type of 
shift and change.”).  
 240. See Disegno di Legge 21 novembre 2011, n. 962 (It.) (draft bill); Disegno di Legge 21 
novembre 2011, no. 3016 (It.) (draft bill); see also Legge 5 dicembre 2005, n. 251 (It.). 
 241. Telephone Conversation with Maurizio Fiorilli, supra note 116. 
 242. Nomos (3028:2002) art. 25 Gia tin prostasia twn Arxaiotitwn kai en genei tis Polistikis 
Klironomias [On the Protection of Antiquities and of the Cultural Heritage in General], 2002 (Greece). 
 243. Id. art. 25(1) (on the loan and exchange of movable monuments that belong to the State). 
(3) BELTRAMETTI_POST-FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2013  1:46 PM 
2013] MUSEUM STRATEGIES:  LEASING ANTIQUITIES 251 
 
constituting a collection shall not be broken.244  Although it is not entirely clear 
how the assessment is made, it seems that an object can be loaned unless the object 
is a true landmark in Greece.  Currently the loans from Greece that have followed 
from cooperation agreements have not completed their course,  it is therefore 
difficult to predict whether the Greeks will apply their cultural heritage code in a 
flexible way similar to that of the Italians. 
D.  INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF RESOURCES 
Resources available to antiquities departments of museums to further their 
antiquities collections vary.  The Getty, the Met and the Princeton Museum have 
substantial endowments and can afford to buy the items in which they have a 
substantial interest.  In particular, some past acquisitions required big sums of 
money within a short period of time:  the Met bought the Euphronios krater in 1972 
for $1.2 million; the Getty spent $3.95 million for a bronze statue of an athlete in 
1977, $9.5 million for the statue of a kouros in 1985 and $18 million for the statue 
of a goddess in 1988.245 
Decisions on acquisitions are typically made by a museum’s board of trustees 
after the antiquities curator in charge makes the case for acquisition.  The Getty and 
the Met tend not to have specific funds allocated exclusively to antiquities 
acquisitions; depending on how the trustees view the acquisition plan of a specific 
department in relation to other departments, they will decide where to invest during 
a given year.246  The set-up of an institution is also important:  whereas the Met is 
run as charity, the Getty is managed as a private operating foundation, and, in order 
to retain its tax-advantaged status, it is legally required to spend a specified portion 
of its endowment assets or investment income.247  This portion amounts to 4.25% 
of endowment assets each year.248  Given that the endowment figures are publicly 
available, it is possible to calculate the exact amount the Getty Trust is supposed to 
spend to run its four programs, the foundation, the conservation institute, the 
research institute and the museum.249  This gives an indication of the institution’s 
 
 244. Id. art. 25(2). 
 245. See FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 1, at 14–18, 25, 64, 95. 
 246. Conversation with Sharion Cott, supra note 125; Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 
125. 
 247. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4942(j)(3), 501(c)(3) (2012); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL 
REVENUE MANUAL § 7.26.6.3.4; Financial Information, GETTY TRUST, http://www.getty.edu/ 
about/governance/finance.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013); Annual Reports, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM 
OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/annual-reports (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 248. JOHN WALSH & DEBORAH GRIBBON, THE J. PAUL GETTY MUSEUM AND ITS COLLECTIONS: A 
MUSEUM FOR THE NEW CENTURY 76 (1997); see also S. Nuray Akin et al., Rushing to Overpay: 
Deadlines, Search, and Purchase-Contingent Benefits 2 (unpublished paper) (on file with the author). 
 249. Calculations of the endowment values are on file with the author.  The museum program of 
the Getty includes two separate collections: the Getty Center in Los Angeles, which houses pre-
twentieth-century European paintings, drawings, sculpture, manuscripts, decorative arts, and nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century photographs; and the Getty Villa in Malibu entirely dedicated to antiquities from 
ancient Rome, Greece and Etruria. 
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wealth.  However, what is more important in this context is the fact that because 
nothing in these institutions’ internal regulations seems to prevent the use of such 
resources to lease antiquities, the method of acquiring artworks seems to stay 
within the discretion of the president and the trustees.250 
The situation is more complex in the case of the Princeton Museum.  Princeton’s 
endowment for the acquisition of artworks is substantial.  “Our assets for 
purchasing works of art are greater than the ones of any other university museum,” 
states it director, and “this has to do with the exceptional historical levels of giving 
by university alumni, including the fact that sixty percent of Princeton’s alumni 
donate annually.  Some make restricted gifts for art acquisition, and some donate 
works of art directly.”251  However, the complication lies in the fact that there are 
two types of transactions taking place when an object is donated to a museum—the 
first occurs between the donor and the museum and the second between the 
museum and the seller—and some funds donated for art acquisitions are held in 
trust for purchases only.252  The fact that some of these funds are restricted and do 
not take into account other collecting options would likely be a limiting factor for 
the implementation of leasing strategies.  If a donor dies without leaving 
instructions for the trustee, the terms of the trust cannot be changed to include 
leasing.253  On the other hand, when the donors are alive, or if a donor’s 
instructions are more open-ended, the terms governing the use of funds could be 
modified to include leasing if market developments favor this method of collecting 
antiquities.  This does not exclude the introduction of innovative instruments such 
as specific fundraising or the creation of new endowments for the leasing of art. 
Although in the end it is a question of internal negotiation and policies, it 
appears that the museums discussed in this Article and several others have 
sufficient resources to support antiquities departments, and, if leasing becomes the 
most efficient way to show and study cultural objects, the relevant funds could be 
allocated in the same way in which they are allocated to an acquisition.  Other than 
those restricted funds that were set up for acquisitions only, there generally do not 
appear to be internal policies in place that would discourage or prohibit the 
collecting of antiquities through leases. 
IV.  CHANGING ART SYSTEMS 
Changes in the governmental attitude and structure in the United States, as well 
as in source countries, could facilitate the negotiation of new trade instruments such 
as leases and strengthen cooperation in terms of solving the legal issues 
surrounding the international trade of cultural objects.  Assuming that a U.S. 
museum is willing to spend money on leasing an artifact, the lending institution of 
 
 250. See BD. OF TRS., J. PAUL GETTY TRUST, supra note 135; Collections Management Policy, 
supra note 135, § IV. 
 251. Conversation with James Steward, supra note 125. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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a source country must agree to the terms of the lease.  In many source countries, 
ministries of culture make these decisions, while individual museums make these 
decisions in the United States.  The institutional differences between the U.S. 
system and ministry-based systems deserve a brief analysis.254  The following 
discussion determines the potential role of regulation in correcting the present 
inefficiencies in this area of law.255 
When asked about whether she would welcome the introduction of leasing 
strategies as a new way of collecting artifacts, the Getty senior antiquities curator 
hints that the prospect of earning income through loan fees would involve the risk 
of taking decisions based on finance rather than what is best for the object.256  The 
Getty senior curator voices a very common sentiment in this field:  the value of 
education that goes with the research of art objects stands in stark contrast with the 
political apparatus and bureaucratic decisions as to monetary value—a contrast 
which would create the risk of confusing priorities in a way that is not in the 
public’s interest.257  She further argues that “cooperation agreements have to be 
viewed in the context of diplomacy: such exchanges and collaboration emphasize a 
much broader international relation point.”258 
It is, however, difficult to anticipate what kind of diplomacy is possible between 
a privately run nonprofit organization and the ministry of culture of a source nation.  
A governmental ministry can by its nature engage in diplomatic exchanges, which 
is what has been happening with the signing of the cooperation agreements.  On the 
other hand, as well-intended as they might be, U.S. museums are pursuing their 
private interests and not the interests of a national art policy.259  U.S. art museums 
such as the Getty and the Met are private institutions founded upon and sustained 
by private donations of funds or works of art.260  Their activities follow their own 
rules and are decided upon by an independent board of appointed trustees.261  The 
actions of private museums are only marginally prescribed by government 
 
 254. See John Henry Merryman, Art Systems and Cultural Policy, 15 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 99 
(2010) (comparing the American art system to other countries’ systems). 
 255. See DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS (1989) (on regulatory economics in 
general). 
 256. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125. 
 257. Telephone Conversation with Jasper Gaunt, supra note 215; see also Dick Netzer, Cultural 
Policy: An American View, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 1223, 1233 
(Ginsburg and Throsby eds., 2006).  When the National Endowment for the Arts and the National 
Endowment for the Humanities were established in 1965, some opposed the creation of these bodies 
because they feared the politicization and bureaucratization of the cultural sector.  See EDWARD C. 
BANFIELD, THE DEMOCRATIC MUSE: VISUAL ARTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1984); MICHAEL 
MACDONALD MOONEY, THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE: CONNECTIONS AMONG ART, MONEY AND 
POLITICS (1980); Merryman, supra note 254 (discussing the deductible status of gifts to non-profit 
institutions).  Merryman argues that by allowing tax deductions for gifts to museums and thereby 
forgoing taxable income for its own use, the U.S. government is indirectly supporting such institutions.  
Id. at 103–04. 
 258. Conversation with Claire Lyons, supra note 125. 
 259. Merryman, supra note 254, at 108, 113–14. 
 260. Id. at 100–02. 
 261. Id. at 100. 
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authorities.262  Furthermore, professional organizations, such as the AAMD, the 
American Association of Museums (AAM) and the Association of Art Museum 
Curators (AAMC), are self-governing bodies.263  Even though the associations are 
certainly important from a public perspective because the standards represent a 
consensus on broad issues concerning museum administration, they remain 
privately regulated entities.264 
The model of the U.S. museum operated by private funds has been successful if 
we consider the role in education and scholarship and the impressive collections of 
U.S. institutions.  However, whenever such institutions commit a misdeed, such as 
the acquisition of objects of doubtful provenance, they are rarely held 
accountable.265  Even though state attorney generals have jurisdiction to hold 
museums accountable for their wrongful actions, there has been much less 
oversight in the area of art acquisitions.266  For instance, when the Attorney 
General of California opened an inquiry into the Getty’s misuse of funds in 2002, it 
was almost all related to the personal expenses of its chief executives and not to the 
acquisition of tainted artifacts.267  Thus, the existing regulatory environment relying 
on the attorney general’s power to sanction museums has not been working 
satisfactorily in this area.  Few and ineffective enforcement mechanisms, little 
transparency and inadequate disclosure highlight major failures in the system; the 
buying of illicitly excavated artifacts and the resulting scandals have shown that the 
model of the responsible institution based on standards of professional practice has 
often failed in the context of the antiquities trade.  This suggests that the 
introduction of legal standards regulating behavior and standardizing processes 
could benefit the public’s trust in institutions and the credibility of U.S. institutions 
and the U.S. art system in general, and supplement standards of professional 
practice in fostering accountability in this field.268 
Until now, the role of the Department of State in setting standards in the cultural 
field has been minimal.  There is nothing comparable to a ministry of culture in the 
United States, and although there is a Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, it 
seems that no specific body has decision-making power over general cultural policy 
 
 262. Id.  
 263. Id. at 104. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Merryman, supra note 204; see also John Henry Merryman, Are Museum Trustees and 
the Law Out of Step?, ARTNEWS, Nov. 1975, at 24. 
 266. Merryman, supra note 204, at 574. 
 267. Robin Fields & Jason Felch, State Examines Spending at Getty, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, at 
B1. 
 268. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger C. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in 
STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 1, 35–36 (Gary Fromm ed., 1981).  Joskow and Noll refer to the 
“Normative Analysis as a Positive Theory,” according to which regulation is the manifestation of 
political pressure brought to bear by the public, which in turn demands that a market failure be 
corrected.  Id.  The establishment of regulatory bodies was meant to eliminate inefficiencies engendered 
by market failure. See id.; see also W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND 
ANTITRUST 2–3 (1995). 
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issues.269  There is, however, a Cultural Heritage Center, a sub-branch of the Office 
of Policy and Evaluation, which is a sub-branch of the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs.270  This marginalized entity administers the implementation of the 
1970 Convention through the Cultural Property Advisory Committee, the 
committee that evaluates the bilateral agreements discussed above.271  The staff of 
this small governmental body is mainly composed of archaeologists.272  This can 
best be understood as the result of effective lobbying by the Archaeological 
Institute of America (AIA) for the passage of the CPIA.273  The AIA convinced 
Congress that the concern for the loss of scientific knowledge due to illicit trade 
was legitimate, and that ratifying the 1970 Convention would make the United 
States, as a market country, an example of leadership in this area.274  This way, 
archaeologists captured governmental influence and turned it to their own benefit, 
not only by effectively lobbying for regulation in the first place, but also by 
occupying staff positions of the Cultural Heritage Center.275  The lobbying efforts 
of the other groups of interested parties such as museums and dealers were less 
organized and persuasive, and their interests are less well-represented.276  This 
resulted in the granting of import restrictions that are broader than the ones 
envisioned during the Congressional debate.277 
On the international level, one of the major standard setting bodies in the ambit 
 
 269. See Merryman, supra note 254, at 104–05.  He explains that the National Endowment for the 
Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) come closest to a U.S governmental 
institution devoted to culture and the arts.  Id.  However, their budgets are limited if compared with the 
resources of some U.S. museums, and although their activities resemble those of an official authority, 
their impact is not particularly strong.  Id. at 105.  These endowments are very important in supporting 
their projects, but they cannot substitute a centralized unit that has decision-making power with regards 
to cultural heritage.  When these endowments were established by Congress in 1965 as independent 
federal agencies, Congress thought about giving these institutions more powers and therefore bringing 
them closer to the idea of a ministry of culture was aired, but there was a reluctance to make art and 
culture a subject for bureaucratic administration.  Id. at 104 n.21. 
 270. Organizational Structure, BUREAU EDUC. & CULTURAL AFF., http://eca.state.gov/about-
bureau-0/organizational-structure (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
 271. See 19 U.S.C. § 2605 (2012).  
 272. See Efrat, supra note 7, at 47–49, 53–60 (explaining the exact lobbying strategies of 
archaeologists, dealers and collectors). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. DEREK FINCHAM, JUSTICE AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE MOVEMENT: USING 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE TO APPRAISE ART AND ANTIQUITIES DISPUTES 35 (2012); see also George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).  Stigler 
explains that even though regulatory agencies may have been created with the intention of correcting 
market failures, as time goes by the agency is subject to “capture” by the interest group they regulate, 
and invariably will tend to issue regulations to improve the group’s well-being.  Id. at 3.  As its name 
suggests, Stigler’s paper founded what has come to be called “the economic theory of regulation.”  Gary 
Becker argues that the result is therefore one produced by the collective pressure of all groups—not a 
single entity.  Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 
3 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983) (presenting a theory of competition among pressure groups for political 
influence). 
 276. See Efrat, supra note 7, at 78–85. 
 277. Id. 
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of culture is UNESCO.  At UNESCO, countries are represented by their own 
diplomats, who are governmental officers appointed by the executive departments 
of their central governments.278  For instance, a diplomat representing Italy at 
UNESCO meetings on cultural matters has to execute orders coming from Italy’s 
ministry of culture.  Lacking such an entity, members of the U.S. mission to 
UNESCO coordinate with the Bureau of International Organizations in 
Washington, D.C. or with the Cultural Heritage Center when the 1970 Convention 
is at issue.279  The minimal involvement of the U.S. government in cultural issues 
and the lack of a national art policy impact the work of the United States at an 
international level because the concerns and interests of major American players, 
such as museums, collectors and dealers, are not sufficiently taken into account 
when formulating international policy. 
In many source countries, such as Italy and Greece, the picture looks very 
different.  Decision-making power with regard to cultural issues stays with the 
relevant highest governmental authority, the ministry of culture.  These systems are 
centralized and hierarchical:  state officers decide on cultural policies, programs 
and operations, and all major museums in source countries are public institutions.  
The central direction of the ministry supervises all areas relating to culture, 
including the permission to loan objects, the regulation of archaeological 
excavations, and the powers and duties of professional archaeologists and museum 
professionals.  The public officers working in the ministries include politicians, 
lawyers, museum experts, archaeologists and other professionals.  To date, the 
Italian ministry employs 25,000 people.280  Decisions on loans of artifacts are made 
at three levels of the hierarchy:  first, the individual museum has to agree; then, the 
regional office gives an opinion; finally, the ministry decides on the proposal.281  In 
some cases an advisory body composed of high-ranking professionals sits in 
judgment to give an opinion if so requested.282  The seats on the advisory body, as 
well as senior positions in regional offices, are elected positions, which means that 
politics inform decisions on culture quite directly.283 
A problem with this set-up is that the officers who make decisions have been 
trained to think that the scientific character of archaeological research can only be 
accomplished if objects are understood and kept in their original context, not far 
 
 278. Conversation with Carolyn Willson, Senior Legal Advisor, Permanent Delegation of the U.S. 
to UNESCO, in Paris, Fr. (Dec. 15, 2011). 
 279. Id. 
 280. See Legge 6 dicembre 2011, n. 201 (It.); see also Marta Romana, Dallo “Stato-provvidenza” 
alla “cittadinanza culturale,” IL GIORNALE DELL’ARTE (June 2012), available at 
http://www.ilgiornaledellarte.com/articoli/2012/6/113600.html. 
 281. Conversation with Jeanette Papadopoulos, supra note 34. 
 282. See La struttura organizzativa, MINISTERO PER I BENI E LE ATTIVITÀ CULTURALI, 
http://www.beniculturali.it/mibac/export/MiBAC/sito-MiBAC/MenuPrincipale/Ministero/La-struttura-
organizzativa/index.html_85114179.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2012) (describing the organizational 
structure and competence of the so-called “Scientific Committee for Archaeological Heritage” 
(Comitato Tecnico-Scientifico per i Beni Archeologici). 
 283. Id.; see also Conversation with Jeanette Papadopoulos, supra note 34. 
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away from the place from which they are excavated.284  This fossilized attitude to 
exhibiting and collecting makes the case for the commoditization of antiquities 
problematic, as it would mean trading the promulgation of knowledge through 
scientific research for other values.  However, the mentality of Italian bureaucrats 
appears to be changing.  Such change in approach became clear with the recent 
introduction of several reforms in the cultural heritage field.285  Over the past year, 
the Italian government introduced measures to facilitate tax deductions for 
donations and procedures to sponsor projects involving cultural heritage so that it 
would be easier for “private money” to fund cultural activities.286  These major 
innovations in the Italian scenario enabled billionaire Diego Della Valle to fund the 
25 million-Euro restoration project for the Colosseum in Rome.287 The role of the 
state as sole promoter and financial supporter for culture is adapting to another 
reality based on new ways of sharing and promoting culture, as well as on the 
evolving financial needs of the cultural sector, which can no longer be wholly or 
sufficiently met by the state.  These reforms reflect a new awareness that culture 
impacts the quality of the rights of citizenship and represent a meeting place for the 
integration of identities and a shared commitment.288  The current Italian minister 
for culture defines this change of approach as “a movement towards cultural 
citizenship.”289  This movement may well support a model that conceives of culture 
as an investment that can attract international resources, for instance, through the 
leasing of antiquities. 
The deputy attorney general for Italy agrees that leasing could be a “viable 
option, a helpful model that would benefit the situation on both ends.”290  Jeanette 
Papadopoulos, a director of the antiquities section at the Italian ministry of culture, 
is dubious about charging for leasing antiquities, stating that conservation work is 
beneficial to the object in a way that monetary compensation could not be.291  This 
skepticism can be addressed in the following way:  there should be no problem if 
monetary and scientific values coexist and if the revenues obtained through leases 
were used to improve the preservation of objects and the security of archaeological 
sites.  This would require the establishment of an instrument that holds specific 
funds on trust for the purposes of research, preservations, etc., as opposed to the 
funds being mixed with the general monies of the national treasury.  Another 
option would be to loan in exchange for the financing of specific cultural projects, 
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such as the excavation of a site or the renovation of a museum, although this does 
not solve the complications posed by barter transactions explained above.  Overall, 
recent changes demonstrate that a more entrepreneurial vision is increasingly 
realistic. 
The divide between the United States and the ministry-based systems is 
enormous, and this is best summarized in an intention-versus-rewards analysis.  
The intentions of the parties differ because, until now, Italy has had a politically 
charged ministry with little motivation to monetize scientific research, whereas the 
U.S. museum mentality is more oriented towards public education and engagement.  
The interest of a privately run museum is to provide its public and patrons with 
exhibitions that include prestigious objects explained in the new contexts that result 
from curatorial skill, insight and vision.292  For instance, the interest of a museum 
director negotiating a cooperation agreement with a foreign ministry lies in 
obtaining the best possible deal in terms of loans, partnerships and exchanges that 
will profit his institution.  On the other side, officers of a ministry have no interest 
in having important national objects kept abroad for an indefinite time.  By 
granting loans, a source country is seeking help in combating illicit trade and 
encouraging international restitutions on a broader scale, as well as securing other 
forms of cooperation.  Referring to the cooperation agreements, the deputy attorney 
general for Italy confirms that “the accords delineate a cultural project that is 
broader than the mere returns:  loans are being used as cultural propositions 
towards the cause of combating illicit trade.”293   
This asymmetry in interests and intentions does not preclude a mutually 
beneficial deal between source and destination countries.  The realpolitik would 
consist of changing the reward system and making it such that the reputation of the 
parties and the conservation and security of objects and sites is achieved.  
Education and enjoyment do not require ownership interests in the destination 
countries; therefore, leasing could be a satisfactory option.  Meanwhile, many 
source countries face financial difficulties and would benefit from leasing revenues.  
The problem up until now has been that nationalist and populist pressures have 
forced source countries to take an uncompromising retentionist position.294  A 
market in leasing should relieve this pressure while also helping to undermine the 
black market. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Combating illicit trafficking and the sustainable movement of objects is possible 
only through a strong spirit of cooperation.  This Article has shown that the global 
trade in cultural material is plagued by several complexities that have created a 
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climate of fear for museums, which resulted in a decline in trade.  The prospect of 
facing criminal liability for importing an artifact deters museums from making new 
investments in such material.  This is unfortunate, because museums play a special 
role in the shaping of cultural policy:  besides being the safest places in which to 
keep art accessible, they are also in a unique position to push for a limited, 
legalized trade in cultural objects.  At this moment in time, major scandals 
involving the buying of illicitly excavated artifacts by several prestigious 
institutions said to be carrying out their mission on public trust have tarnished the 
reputation of the antiquities market and raised anti-acquisition, pro-retention 
sentiments.  This is an unwelcome development that ignores the fact that the 1970 
UNESCO Convention was never meant to freeze the art market.  The introduction 
of a new model for acquiring antiquities based on cooperation and complemented 
by long-term leasing would enable museums to continue carrying out their 
collecting activities and their educational function in an ethical way. 
This Article has outlined how a leasing model for antiquities could be 
implemented.  There are many advantages associated with the use of formal leases:  
they would allow objects to be studied and exhibited at foreign institutions for 
negotiable periods of time; they would enhance the value of the object as well as 
the exposure of the hosting institution; and they would also create resources for art-
rich countries to be invested in the preservation of their cultural heritage.  Most 
importantly, they would make it possible for objects to circulate yet, at the same 
time, stay under the ownership and jurisdiction of their respective source countries.  
This would prevent the risk of reputational and economic damage associated with 
acquiring unprovenanced objects.  Considering the present situation of the 
antiquities market, where provenanced objects are scarce and prices high, the 
rational decision for museums should be to engage in leasing.  Altogether, the 
success of loans through cooperation agreements is a strong indicator that leasing 
strategies have the potential of being successful as well, and in the long-run the 
development of such tools could support a good measure of the international 
demand. 
Leasing also presents a good compromise in view of the nationalist versus 
internationalist debate.  It would enable people around the world to be exposed to 
antiquities as the internationalists advocate, but still satisfy the nationalist interest 
by keeping the ownership interest with source nations.  Although a more effective 
solution might be to change patrimony laws to allow for the sale of duplicates or 
material in storage—and in this scenario leasing would apply only to cultural 
treasures of a very high rank, namely the ones that source countries will refuse to 
sell—at this moment in time, a sales market is neither possible nor desired by 
source countries.   
Leasing is a pragmatic solution, especially considering the scarce resources and 
the immense patrimonies that several countries need to protect.  However, a great 
step towards implementation requires source countries’ ministries to accept the 
trading of cultural material as a way to create resources.  While we wait for a truly 
international approach to find its footing through more radical legal changes, the 
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development of a solid leasing system could not only reduce illicit trafficking by 
changing the conduct of the actors in the art market but also thereby provide a 
realistic and sensible solution to the present deficiencies in the antiquities market. 
